The Cold War and Civil Rights 253became clear as the tabulation of votes continued through election
night. First, in the big cities, the Taft-Hartley Act convinced labor that
the Republicans had rejected its support. Next, Truman attracted the
farm vote of the Midwest by advocating the retention of price supports
at ninety percent of parity, whereas the Republicans mentioned only
“flexible” price support. Moreover, the rebellion by leftists against the
President convinced Americans that the Truman administration was
not soft on communism, as the Republicans tried to insinuate. In addi-
tion, the revolt by southerners provided proof to African-Americans
that the Democratic Party was not dominated by racist bigots and was
their best hope for obtaining much-needed and long-delayed civil
rights legislation. More than anything else, the fact that the nation
enjoyed peace and prosperity helped the Democratic Party immeasur-
ably. And, finally, the Republicans, starting with Dewey, took the
people for granted and acted as though their election were a foregone
conclusion, something that is always a mistake in politics.
Truman interpreted his victory as a clear message from the elector-
ate that they wanted a continuation of the domestic reform fi rst initi-
ated by the New Deal. In his inaugural address of January 20 , 1949 , he
described his program as a “Fair Deal,” which would raise the mini-
mum wage from to forty to seventy-five cents an hour; expand Social
Security benefi ciaries to 10 million with big increases in benefi ts for
retirees; extend rent control over 800 , 000 new housing units for
low-income families; enlarge the TVA, irrigation, and other water-
control and hydroelectric projects; and enact price supports for farmers.
But attempts to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act and obtain legislation for
civil rights, national health insurance, and federal aid to education
failed. However, by executive decree, Truman did advance civil rights
within the armed forces and abolished segregation in the federal civil
service.
Unfortunately, another “Red Scare” developed that ended the bipar-
tisan support that Truman had enjoyed in winning passage for many
parts of his Fair Deal program. Any number of leading Republicans in
Congress, especially Senator Robert Taft, attempted to reap political
gain by attacking the patriotism and impugning the loyalty of the
Democratic Party generally and the Truman administration specifi -
cally. The immediate cause was the Communists’ seizure of China in