Sammy Zahran
Colorado State UniversityWhat do we need to know: What are the major sociological research questions?
According to the logic of collective action, voluntary groups are more likely to succeed if group participants
accrue selective (excludable) benefits for participation in the group enterprise. In Mancur Olson’s (1971: 51)
words: “Only a separate and ‘selective’ incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in
group-oriented ways.” Olson (1971) explained the logic of collective action as a function of costs (C) or time,
money and effort expended to produce a collective good; valued benefits that flow to individual participants of
a group (Vi), and the relative advantages (Ai) an individual obtains from participation in the group enterprise.
Prospects of success in voluntary groups depend on the advantages gained by individual participants, where Ai =
Vi - C. If Ai > 0, the prospects of group success are good, with likelihoods of individual participation high. If Ai <
0, the group is likely to fail (absent selective incentives that induce participation).
The Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) campaign, sponsored by the International Council for Local
Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) is a voluntary collective enterprise that coordinates the climate change
mitigation efforts of 800+ municipalities worldwide (ICLEI 2007). The CCP mission is to enlist “cities to adopt
policies and implement measures to achieve quantifiable reductions in local greenhouse gas emissions, improve
local air quality, and enhance urban livability and sustainability.” The CO 2 target set for cities is a 20 percent
reduction from 1990 levels (Collier and Lofstedt 1997; Betsill 2000). This “Toronto Target” is significantly more
stringent than the Kyoto Protocol.
With 800+ municipalities worldwide working toward this reduction target, and an estimated 10 percent
annual increase in the number of localities joining the effort (ICLEI, 2005), the collective benefits of the CCP
campaign are potentially significant. In the United States, 100+ localities participate in this voluntary collective
enterprise (see Map 1). By my estimation, the 100+ localities involved in the CCP campaign account for about
one-fifth of all GHG emissions in the United States – at one-fifth of US emissions, this locally driven enterprise is
of significant global consequence, and deserving of scholarly attention (particularly from sociologists).
What makes this local climate change collection action phenomenon interesting is that from a strictly
rational choice perspective it is unclear why a local government would voluntarily assume the costs of climate
change protection when: 1) reducing local emissions will not fully insulate a locality from the transboundary
effects of global climate change; 2) the costs of climate change mitigation are higher than the expected benefits
when participation is low and voluntary; 3) the collective benefits of climate protection (like temperature stability)
are non-excludable, inducing free-riding; and 4) there is no federate assistance to offset the costs of climate
change protection efforts – in fact, the US Congress prohibits use of federal monies for programs defined as
implementing the Kyoto Protocol before ratification (Betsill 2000). With such powerful status quo incentives, why
would a US locality join the CCP campaign? And, why would a US locality spend scarce resources on a social
and environmental problem with dim prospects of payoff?
What do we know: What does Sociology bring to the table for studying the human dimensions of global
climate change?
My colleagues and I have tried to answer these questions (see Zahran, Brody et al. 2008a; Zahran, Brody et
al. 2008b; and Brody, Zahran, et al. forthcoming). Theoretically, our work is informed by the human ecology
tradition in sociology. Methodologically, our work is nested in the social indicators tradition of sociology. In our