getting them to sign on the dotted line. Those days are over.”
Bewildered by events, the innocent Dahlerus totally out
of his depth in this maelstrom of high diplomacy flew back
from London to Berlin. He boarded Göring’s command train at
: .. The field marshal told him that at that moment Rib-
bentrop was putting the sixteen-point proposal to Henderson;
at Kurfürst, Göring asked him to phone the British embassy to
obtain their first reactions. A senior official there revealed that
Ribbentrop had merely “gabbled through” the long document
in German, had declared it überholt (out of date) since no Pole
had arrived, and tossed it on to the table, where it remained un-
read.
Göring froze. It was vital that London learn and digest the
Sixteen Points. He directed Dahlerus to dictate the document
over the phone to the British embassy. Shortly, his wiretappers
heard Henderson repeating the text to Lipski and suggesting
that Poland and Germany bring together “their two field mar-
shals,” Göring and Rydz-Smigly.
Lipski went back to bed. He ignored the document, as
Hitler and Göring had hoped he would.
It was August , the last day of the Old World. Tempers were
fraying. Henderson was old and terminally ill a diplomat and
gentleman surrounded by knaves and reporting to fools.
Shortly after : .. the wiretappers heard Warsaw in-
structing Lipski “not to enter into any concrete negotiations”;
then Henderson warning the Polish embassy that there were
only a few hours left; then Henderson repeating this to the For-
eign Office in London, while adding uneasily that it might all be
a Nazi bluff.
Unaccustomed to these lethal poker games, the weak-kneed
in Berlin diplomatic circles were losing their nerve. At about