Not entirely capable of suppressing his own apprehensions,
Goebbels noted that the campaign had “parallels with Napo-
leon,” and that these had momentarily troubled the Reichsmar-
schall too.
Hitler’s plan to aid Mussolini in Greece was dramatically
complicated by a pro-British coup in Yugoslavia on March .
He was enjoying a farewell tête-à-tête with Dahlerus at midday
when he received the sudden summons from Hitler to attend,
along with Ribbentrop and the other commanders in chief, a
briefing at the Reich Chancellery. Göring noted merely,
“:–: .., Führer briefing (Yugoslavia).” Hitler was in an
ominously buoyant mood, because he had made one of his sud-
den snap decisions: He announced that he had resolved to
“smash Yugoslavia” immediately, at the same time as invading
Greece. Equipped with Hitler’s simple order, the air force and
army swiftly pulled together the additional forces that a Yugo-
slav campaign would require. After a late lunch, Göring had a
two-hour conference with Udet, Waldau, Schmid, and Quar-
termaster General von Seidel. General von Waldau noted in his
own diary: “In the afternoon I am summoned to see the
Reichsmarschall at the Führer’s official residence. The Yugoslav
putsch has created a new situation in the Balkans. The decision is
made to mount a military operation as rapidly as possible.
Göring reported back to the Führer at : .. The Luft-
waffe’s task would be to destroy the Yugoslav and Greek ground
organization, after flattening Belgrade itself by saturation
bombing. Waldau worked far into the night switching air-force
squadrons from the west to the southeast: the KG bomber
wing would move to Wiener-Neustadt; the bombers of KG, the
dive bombers of Stuka , the fighters of JG would leapfrog
across Europe to new bases in the same region. “What is politi-
cally absolutely essential,” commented Waldau after conferring