why Germany had no option but to strike at Russia. Deputy
Chief of Staff von Waldau recorded a summary in his diary:
Hitler’s after-luncheon speech. The main enemy is
still Britain. Britain will fight on as long as the fight
has any purpose.... But Britain’s fight only makes
sense as long as they can hope that American aid will
take effect and that they may find support on the
Continent. This explains why they have high hopes
that the Russians will intervene.... We want this
conflict with Russia to come early, however. Indeed, it
is absolutely essential, if we are not to forfeit the favor-
able conditions that now prevail.“The bulk of the Russian forces,” continued Waldau’s note, “are
standing on the frontier, so we have a good chance of defeating
them right there.” At : .., Göring briefed Hitler alone on
the Luftwaffe’s plans. He would commit twenty-seven hundred
warplanes on the first day. Reconnaissance pictures showed four
thousand Soviet planes just across the demarcation line, and ra-
dio intelligence had located a thousand more. Göring’s own at-
titude was hard to divine Waldau remarked on his “meager
interest,” and when the Reichsmarschall assembled his
Luftflotte, air zone (Luftgau), and corps commanders at Carin-
hall the next day, Milch too thought him “depressed.” After a
long stroll around the garden at Carinhall, that evening Göring
returned to Berlin, talked for over an hour with his art dealers
Behr, Lohse, and Hofer, and boarded his train. At eight-thirty it
moved off, and as though materializing from thin air, the mys-
terious Swede, Dahlerus, entered his private cabin.
Five days later the Polish prime minister, an exile in Lon-
don, met American ambassador Tony Biddle. Biddle reported
his conversation that same day in a letter to President Roosevelt: