versation turned to procuring vegetable oils from North Africa,
Göring affably launched into a discourse on how he was stock-
piling food by worldwide black-market operations “often
without letting his right hand know what his left hand was u p
to.”
This allusion to oil procurement was a first hint of prob-
lems to come. The shortage of refined aviation spirit was already
setting back Luftwaffe training and operations. Russian petro-
leum reserves, estimated at two thousand million tons, would
provide the only long-term solution to Hitler’s needs. Accord-
ing to the figures shown to Göring, the Baku Field beyond the
Caucasus Mountains had reserves of million tons, followed
by Maykop with million, and Groznyy with million. But
there was a snag: The retreating Russians had comprehensively
sabotaged the wells, and the German invaders lacked the exper-
tise and drilling equipment to restore production. They would
need at least rigs, and Göring now found that he had not set
aside enough steel to make them.
On July , he called in the oil experts to discuss how to
bring Maykop back into production once this field was cap-
tured. “Are we clear,” he asked, “how we are going to tackle the
demolitions? My own hope is that in the circumstances they will
have had no time to carry out demolitions, because the wells are
kept pumping until the last minute.”
The experts dispelled his optimism. “I think,” said one,
“that once they’ve been prepared, demolitions are feasible in a
very few hours.”
At Kherson in the Ukraine the Germans were reassembling
a refinery seized and dismantled in France. This would be able to
produce four hundred thousand tons a year, but it would take
until May to erect. “Does it have to take so long?” asked
Göring.