this war, should satisfy you immediately that I continue to shape
the crucial affairs of the Four-Year Plan despite my preoccupa-
tion with the air force.”
He was still in Berlin two weeks later as the Red Army
counteroffensive at Stalingrad began, across the River Don. On
the next day, November , the Russians established a second
breach in the German lines. Göring, telephoned about these de-
velopments by Hitler, was not especially concerned. Nothing
shows that he realized that an immense Soviet pincer movement
was beginning and was about to encircle the Sixth Army in
Stalingrad, trapping twenty German divisions, two Romanian,
and the air force’s own th Flak Division. He remained at
Carinhall. It was in Göring’s absence, therefore, that the young
chief of air staff Hans Jeschonnek, who had arrived that day in
Berchtesgaden bringing a skeleton air staff from East Prussia,
made the fateful offer to Hitler: Jeschonnek assured Hitler that
the Luftwaffe could airlift enough supplies into Stalingrad, us-
ing transport planes and bombers, even if the Sixth Army was
encircled there.
At : .. on November , Hitler thus signaled to that
army’s commander, General Paulus, ordering him to stand
firm, “despite the danger of temporary encirclement.” Paulus
was to hold open the rail link as long as possible; an airlift would
follow. Hitler told Colonel Eckhard Christian to get Göring on
the line, then took the instrument from him. Still in Berlin, the
Reichsmarschall agreed that the air force would do what it
could.
The Stalingrad airlift or rather, its failure would ever
after be linked with Göring’s name. Yet for once he was not en-
tirely culpable. Exonerating him three months later, Hitler
would admit to Richthofen that he had promised the airlift to
Paulus “without the Reichsmarschall’s knowledge.”