could not ignore Kesselring’s arguments.
Hearing this, Rommel plunged into a depression. At a joint
session the next morning, December , he heard Göring repeat
that Tripoli must be held. The Reichsmarschall’s optimism now
bordered on the insufferable. For once, he bragged, the Axis had
the edge. “For the first time we are not far removed from the
field of battle. A mere panther’s spring! Therefore, we have
every chance of rushing troops and materiel into Tunisia.” He
promised to pack four first-class divisions into the new Tunis
bridgehead the th Panzer and those bearing the names of
Hitler, Göring and Deutschland. “We must try to push the en-
emy back toward Oran, and then head for Morocco,” he said.
He proposed laying two immense minefields across the
narrow Straits of Sicily, with a safe channel to sluice their trans-
port ships through to North Africa. Germany would supply the
necessary mines. “I realize that this is a vast undertaking,” he
conceded, “but we should think along such lines.” Answering
the angry comments of the Italian Fleet commander, Admiral
Raffaelo Riccardi, and German Admiral Eberhard Weichold, the
Reichsmarschall jeered, “The navy’s prejudices and opinions are
out of date.”
He cabled Hitler afterward, reporting that the Italians
agreed that Rommel’s next line should be at Buerat and speak-
ing of Rommel’s loss of nerve. He handled the field marshal so
tactlessly over lunch that Milch, arriving from Berlin as it
ended, found Rommel upstairs weeping with rage at Göring.
After that, Göring traveled in arrogant luxury aboard Asia
down to Naples, where he talked with the dockhands and in-
spected port defenses. Disregarding Rome completely, he or-
dered the youthful local Fascist chieftain to take charge of the
transport ships to Africa. “Göring,” wrote the indignant Ciano
on the fifth, “continues to preside over meetings to which he