more psychological than real, because the cure that Göring
contemplated was giving Jeschonnek command of a Luftflotte
(the Fourth) and sending Richthofen up to Robinson, the
Luftwaffe’s forward headquarters, to supplant him. Had Göring
not always accused Jeschonnek of being too pliable at the Wolf’s
Lair? “You just stand at attention to the Führer, with your
thumbs on your pant seams!” he had jeered. The job switch
looked like the ideal solution, but Göring hesitated to appoint
such a forceful, blunt-spoken character as Richthofen to Hitler’s
conference table. So the decision was postponed, not once but
several times.
Göring’s own stock was too low at present. People in the
Ruhr were bitter that he did not show his face there. “This,”
wrote Goebbels after seeing Hitler on June , “is why Göring’s
failure oppresses [Hitler] so much: because he’s the only man
capable of taking over if anything should happen to him.”
Summoned to the Führer’s presence the next day, Göring
penciled into his notebook reminders that betray an apprehen-
sive state of mind:
Situation in the south! In the southeast! In the
north! My own position as commander in chief.
Jeschonnek (on leave) Milch (Udet) controversy. M y
own activities (stenographic record, produce my ap-
pointment diary). Influencing subordinates, consult-
ing with them. Troops’ confidence in me.
Worst will be over this autumn. Inspection visits
by me. Examples, Vienna airplane-engine works!
My present task: Overhauling the air force. Clear
technological objectives. Revive flagging spirits.“Please,” he intended to tell Hitler, “make use of Bodenschatz
for any wishes, complaints, or orders.” This was not good