formations (and bail out if they could at the last moment). Gen-
eral Günther Korten, Jeschonnek’s successor, put the idea to
Göring; the Reichsmarschall shared his reservations.
Göring’s own popularity remained undiminished. “Göring
swears like a trooper,” said one admiring Dornier navigator, shot
down in February . “No doubt about it, though, Hermann
is very popular, particularly in Berlin.” At Hitler’s headquarters
his arrival was greeted each time with less enthusiasm. On Octo-
ber , , as Hitler’s distant armies in Russia began to fall
back, he reminded the Reichsmarschall that the defense of
Western Europe was of paramount importance: because there
he could not afford to lose one inch of territory.
The Luftwaffe had lost the initiative, with little prospect of
regaining it until the new mass-produced jet airplanes entered
service. Thus Göring became the most plausible scapegoat for
each Nazi defeat. Speer felt safe in expressing pronounced hos-
tility. On November , Rommel too would tell anybody who
would listen at the high command that Göring had been to
blame for his defeat at El Alamein in “He just refused to
believe the British had air supremacy.” On November , Milch
noted that he had “poured out his heart” to SS Reichsführer
Himmler about the Reichsmarschall.
Perspiring freely, the Reichsmarschall had no option but to
swallow the insults that Hitler hurled at him, often in front of
junior officers. “The Führer’s estrangement from me grew,” he
recalled two years later, speaking with George Shuster. “I could
see his impatience when I briefed him. He often cut me off in
midsentence, and began to intervene more and more in Luft-
waffe affairs.”
“Do you think there’s a squadron left in your air force with
the guts to fly to Moscow?” Hitler would challenge. Ordering
him to intervene in Leningrad, he would sneer “Always as-