ies. In the twelve months up to the end of August , the mis-
sile sites would attract , tons of Allied bombs.
That month the Luftwaffe scored another notable success. Ear-
lier, Koller had requested permission to bring over their small
strategic bomber force, Air Corps, from the eastern front for
mining operations off the invasion beaches. Göring had refused.
“Four Air Corps,” he had replied on June , , “is our last
major reserve in the east. We have to bargain for a major [So-
viet] offensive in the east.” Unexpectedly, it was the Americans
who had cause to regret Göring’s obstinacy. On June , over-
confident and careless in anticipation of victory, they sent
Flying Fortresses to destroy a synthetic-oil plant at Ruhland,
south of Berlin. An He of General von Greim’s Luftflotte
trailed the American bombers as they continued on to the
Ukraine, and from their direction and from captured docu-
ments Luftwaffe commanders could predict that the force
would be landing at Poltava. Göring ordered Air Corps to
raid the Poltava Airfield that same night. Two hundred Luft-
waffe bombers gate-crashed the Russian welcoming party,
blasted them and the boozy Americans with tons of frag-
mentation bombs, and returned to base in eastern Poland with-
out loss. They left behind raging fires at Poltava as , gal-
lons of aviation fuel blew up, silhouetting the blazing wrecks of
forty-three B-s and fifteen P- Mustangs, as well as scores of
Russian aircraft. “Those were wonderful times,” reminisced
Göring to Spaatz when they were all over.
Talking with Koller on June , Hitler was astonished to
learn that the four-engined version of the He would not ap-
pear in squadron service until . But he was not shattered by
the news. “What counts in our present situation,” he said two
days later still, “is to turn out fighters and still more fighters.