officers of these private armies, assembled at his headquarters,
that they were not going to follow a narrow, Bavarian line, but
the nationalist black-white-and-red one. One of the army colo-
nels present, Etzel, heard him talk quite openly of a March on
Berlin (at the Hitler trial Lossow would deny it). The Bavarian
Army now issued order No. a- to the Combat League com-
manders, including Göring, directing them to provide trained
paramilitary personnel to the army preparatory to operation
Autumn Training.
By this time, it must be stressed, the Communist uprisings
in Saxony and Thuringia had been put down, so this army or-
der can only have been for a March on Berlin. “Our impres-
sion,” testified one recipient, “was that the army district head-
quarters and the National Socialists had now reached agree-
ment.”
Feverish activity began. Rifles were serviced, museums
scoured for artillery pieces; SA and Oberland men, volunteering
for Autumn Training, were detailed to report to the “sports
commander” at the infantry regiment barracks on November .
Göring had reason to believe that the police would be on
Hitler’s side. The Bavarian police commander, Colonel Hans
Ritter von Seisser, was the third member of the blue-blooded
triumvirate that ruled Bavaria. His green-uniformed state police
(Landespolizei) lived like soldiers in barracks and were equipped
with heavy weaponry. Hitler had established contact with Seisser
on October , delivered a speech attacking the parliamentary
system, argued that only a military dictatorship under Luden-
dorff could save Germany, and held out the alluring prospect
that Seisser would take over the Reich police force.
Seisser objected that Ludendorff, a militant nationalist, was
anathema to foreign countries.
“I need him to win over the Reichswehr,” Hitler explained,