later). Bruce Hopper, Spaatz’s chief historian, took in the heavy
silver ring on the Reichsmarschall’s third finger, the clear blue
eyes, the ruddy but not unpleasant features, the outsize thighs,
and the tan-colored boots. Göring responded to questions with
a good humor that belied his growing concern.
“In the Battle of Britain,” asked Spaatz, “why did you
maintain such rigid formations of fighters and bombers?”
“It was necessary to escort the bombers because their fire-
power was low (not like your bombers).”
“Was the Junkers designed for the Battle of Britain?”
“We had nothing else,” explained Göring. “I was not in fa-
vor of engaging in the Battle of Britain at that time. It was too
early.”
He asked Spaatz if a bottle of whiskey could be produced,
and General Patch rather grudgingly obliged. Spaatz asked the
Luftwaffe chief whether the jet airplane ever really had a chance
of winning the war.
“Yes,” said Göring, “I am convinced if only we had had
four or five months more. Our underground installations were
practically ready. The factory in the Harz had a capacity of a
thousand to twelve hundred jet airplanes a month. Now with
five to six thousand jets, the outcome would have been very
different!”
Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg, of the Ninth Air
Force, chipped in, “But could you have trained sufficient jet pi-
lots given your shortage of oil?”
“Oh, yes,” replied Göring. “We would have had under-
ground oil plants producing a sufficient quantity for the jets.
The pilots’ conversion to the jets was very easy. Output of jet
pilots was always a month ahead of jet-aircraft production.”
Spaatz leaned forward. He inquired intently which had
contributed more to the defeat of Nazi Germany precision