Encyclopedia of Psychology and Law

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countries has as one of its bases the presumption of
competence. That is, all defendants are presumed
competent unless this issue is called into question by
one of the parties to a legal proceeding. The compe-
tence of a criminal defendant may arise as an issue at
any point in the legal proceedings, from as early as
initial arrest and interrogation, throughout the entire
legal process, and finally to the time of sentencing or,
for those who have been sentenced to the ultimate
penalty of death, the time of execution. Just as an
incompetent defendant is not allowed to proceed to
trial, so too an incompetent defendant/inmate is pro-
hibited from being sentenced or executed. The ratio-
nale against executing incompetent individuals is
that, among other things, it is inhumane, neither
deterrence nor retribution is accomplished, and
incompetent individuals are unable to assist in
appealing their sentence.

Legal Standards
The issue of the constitutionality of executing incom-
petent individuals was heard by the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1986 in Ford v. Wainwright. The Court in
Fo rd held that the Eighth Amendment, which bans
cruel and unusual punishment, prohibits the execution
of an “insane” (mentally incompetent) person. The
Court reasoned that (a) execution of the insane would
offend humanity, (b) executing the insane would not
serve to set an example and would not reaffirm the
deterrence value believed to exist in capital punish-
ment, (c) any individual who is believed to be insane
is also believed unable to prepare “spiritually” for
death, (d) madness itself is punishment and, therefore,
negates the punishment value of execution, and (e) no
retributive value is believed to be served by executing
the mentally incompetent.
The Court in Fo rdalso ruled that when questions of
competency for execution were raised, due process
entitled a defendant to an evidentiary hearing. Further-
more, the Court stated that this evidentiary hearing is
required only when defendants make a “high thresh-
old showing” that their competency to be executed is
in question. The justices, however, did not define the
precise nature of the “high threshold.” Moreover, the
justices could not agree on the specific fact-finding
procedures to be used in case such a threshold is met:
Some agreed that a full “panoply” of trial-type proce-
dures was required, others argued that a more relaxed
hearing was acceptable if due process was ensured,

and still others argued that the most minimal “pro
forma” procedures were acceptable.
In addition to being divided on the fact-finding pro-
cedures, the Court also failed to specify a proper legal
test of incompetence within the execution context.
Only Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion,
addressed the issue of the legal test for competency for
execution, stating that the Eighth Amendment “forbids
the execution only of those who are unaware of the
punishment they are about to suffer and why they are
to suffer it” (p. 2608). Furthermore, he concluded that
the proper test of competency should be whether
defendants can comprehend the nature, pendency, and
purpose of their execution. Justice Powell argued that
the retributive goal of criminal law is satisfied only
when defendants are aware of the connection between
their crime and its punishment and defendants can only
prepare for death if they are aware that it is pending
shortly. Furthermore, Justice Powell asserted that the
states were free to adopt “a more expansive view of
sanity” that included the “requirement that the defen-
dant be able to assist in his own defense” (p. 2608).
Despite the charge given to individual states to
develop procedures to ensure that the insane would
not be executed, many states do not provide specific
guidelines for evaluating competency for execution,
and those guidelines that do exist vary widely. The
decision in Fo rd established that it was unconstitu-
tional to execute the insane and set the stage for psy-
chological evaluations of death row inmates whose
mental status for execution is questionable; however,
the Fo rdCourt left open two critical issues. First, the
Court did not specify the necessary fact-finding pro-
cedures to enforce the Fo rd decision. Second, the
Court failed to specify the proper legal test to be
implemented in cases of competency for execution.
Although it is not legally binding, the American
Bar Association, in the ABA Criminal Justice Mental
Health Standards(1989), has also provided a legal
test for determining competency for execution. This
test reads as follows:

A convict is incompetent to be executed if, as a result
of mental illness or mental retardation, the convict
cannot understand the nature of the pending proceed-
ings, what he or she was tried for, the reasons for the
punishment, or the nature of the punishment. A con-
vict is also incompetent if, as a result of mental illness
or mental retardation, the convict lacks sufficient
capacity to recognize or understand any fact which

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