Encyclopedia of Psychology and Law

values to each of these components, and then sum-

ming them to arrive at a total compensatory damage

award. Jurors are forced to perform a componential

analysis in courts that use special verdict forms that

require them to answer specific questions about the

facts of the case and to calculate awards related to

each set of facts.

Finally, some data suggest that rather than analyz-

ing the components of an injury, jurors reason more

holistically by agreeing on a general figure that

“seems” right. Interviews with jurors who served in

tort and contract cases revealed that approximately

one third of juries determined damages by picking a

number that seemed fair and just.

A peculiar aspect of some civil jury trials is the

application of “blindfold rules,” which prohibit dis-

closure to jurors of the implications of their verdicts.

Judges sometimes blindfold the jury regarding infor-

mation such as attorneys’ fees, the tax consequences

of damage awards, the insurance carried by the par-

ties, and the possibility of additions to or reductions in

damage awards by appellate courts. The rationale for

these rules is that with blindfolds in place, jurors will

not become confused by complex evidence or influ-

enced by evidence that is lacking in probative value.

In fact, there is substantial evidence that blindfold-

ing rules may result in, rather than prevent, verdicts

based on misinformation. Jurors are naturally inclined

to consider information to which they are blindfolded

even when this information is not presented in court.

On occasion, these discussions involve explicit refer-

ence to these so-called “silent topics.” A large percent-

age of jurors interviewed about their deliberations

report that their juries discussed factors such as attor-

neys’ fees and the defendant’s insurance. Even if these

factors are not explicitly talked about, jurors’ implicit

beliefs (not always correct) can influence their ver-

dicts on damages. As a result, awards are sometimes

unpredictable and inconsistent. Research suggests that

it may be preferable to treat jurors like the careful and

thoughtful arbiters they usually are and to provide

them with clear and complete instructions, at least

about those facets of damage awards on which all par-

ties agree.

Reforming Jury Damage Awards

Given the controversial nature of some jury damage

awards, it is not surprising that proposals for changing

the system have been offered, primarily by groups

interested in tort reform. In fact, during the 1980s and

1990s, a majority of state legislatures implemented

laws aimed at reducing jurors’ discretion and reining in

large awards. Among the reforms are laws that cap

damage awards at some specified amount (primarily

for noneconomic and punitive damages) or eliminate

them altogether (for punitive damages), clarify the ele-

ments of damage award decisions, bifurcate the trial

into two segments so that jurors are presented with dis-

crete questions and sets of evidence in each segment

and cannot consider irrelevant evidence, require some

portion of a damage award to be paid to a governmen-

tal or charitable organization rather than to the injured

party, and (as previously mentioned) move punitive

damage assessments from the jury to the judge.

Importantly, many of these reforms were instituted

without empirical backing; as a result, their implica-

tions are only now being understood. But recently

conducted studies have brought into focus some unin-

tended consequences, at least in terms of caps on dam-

ages. For example, mock jury research has shown that

in cases with injuries of low to moderate severity, lim-

its on awards for pain and suffering actually increased

both the size and the variability of the awards. Other

research has shown that although caps on punitive

damage awards certainly reduce the size of punitive

awards, they also increase the size and variability of

compensatory awards. Similarly, caps on noneco-

nomic damages result in larger economic damages,

which are unbounded. Further research suggests that

if jurors are altogether prevented from awarding puni-

tive damages, the compensatory award may be aug-

mented as a way to punish the defendant. These

findings reflect the holistic reasoning notion described

previously. Sometimes, jurors have a sense of “total

justice”—an idea of what they think is fair in terms of

compensation for the injured party and payment by

the injurer—and, lacking clear guidance on the com-

plementary functions of various kinds of damage

awards, do what they can to deliver it.

Psychologists have much to offer in this realm, par-

ticularly by conducting sophisticated psycholegal

research that mirrors jurors’ actual task demands and

that can illuminate the effects of these reform laws on

jurors’ judgments. Carefully conducted empirical

research studies can show how jurors manage the dif-

ficult task of awarding damages and what procedural

changes can help them function more effectively.

Edith Greene

See also Jury Competence; Jury Decisions Versus Judges’

Decisions; Jury Reforms

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