decision, the Supreme Court again revised the thresh-
old for excluding jurors from participation in capital
cases—this time broadening it from unequivocal oppo-
sition to merely holding death penalty attitudes that
would “prevent or substantially impair the perfor-
mance of his [or her] duties as a juror in accordance
with his [or her] instructions and oath” (Wainwright v.
Witt, 1985, p. 852). The significance of the Wittopin-
ion was acknowledged by legal practitioners and
scholars alike, who suggested that the less precise lan-
guage and seemingly broader scope of the Wittformu-
lation would result in a substantial increase in the size
of the excludable group as well as complicate the pre-
cise application of the legal standard of exclusion.
Finally, the death qualification standard underwent
yet another doctrinal change in 1992, when the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that persons whose supportof the
death penalty is so strong that it would “prevent or sub-
stantially impair” the performance of their duties
(sometimes called “automatic death penalty” or “ADP”
jurors) also should be legally disqualified from serving
in capital cases. (See Morgan v. Illinois, 1992.) Thus,
“modern” death qualification now operates to exclude
persons whose death penalty attitudes would merely
“impair” the performance of their functions in a capi-
tal trial, and it eliminates persons on the basis of both
support for as well as opposition to extreme death
penalty. In practical terms, the intended “balancing” of
the standard of exclusion (by including extreme death
penalty supporters as well as opponents) does not seem
to have significantly altered the biasing effects brought
about by death qualification. Scholars and practition-
ers acknowledge that extreme death penalty supporters
are not as readily identified as the comparable group of
death penalty opponents. As a result, death-qualified
juries continue to suffer from many of the biases iden-
tified in the earlier research and relied on as the basis
for constitutional challenges (albeit, in some jurisdic-
tions, on an attenuated basis).Craig HaneySee alsoDeath Penalty; Jury Selection; Voir DireFurther Readings
Allen, M., Mabry, E., & McKelton, D. (2004). The impact
of juror attitudes about the death penalty on juror
evaluations of guilt and punishment. Law and Human
Behavior, 22,715–731.Bersoff, D. (1987). Social science data and the Supreme
Court:Lockhart as a case in point. The American
Psychologist, 42,52–58.
Haney, C. (Ed.). (1984). Death qualification [Special issue].
Law and Human Behavior, 8.
Haney, C., Hurtado, A., & Vega, L. (1994). “Modern” death
qualification: New data on its biasing effects. Law and
Human Behavior, 18,619–633.
Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1 (1980).
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
Thompson, W. (1989). Death qualification after Wainwright v.
Wittand Lockhart v. McCree. Law and Human Behavior,
13,185–215.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 389 U.S. 1035 (1968).DELUSIONS
Delusions are firmly held false beliefs. They are associ-
ated with numerous disorders, including schizophrenia
and delusional disorder, but can also be found in patients
with affective disorders and dementia. Several different
types of delusions are recognized, including erotomanic
delusions, grandiose delusions, jealous delusions, perse-
cutory delusions, delusions of control, nihilistic delu-
sions, delusions of guilt or sin, somatic delusions, and
delusions of reference. Assessment of delusions involves
determination of the etiology as well as the severity and
tenacity of symptom presentation. Treatment is depen-
dent on the etiology of the symptoms and can include
antipsychotic, antidepressant, or mood-stabilizing med-
ications as well as cognitive therapy.Definition of Delusions
Delusions are fixed beliefs that are false and have no
basis in reality. Delusions can be either bizarre, such as
thinking that aliens are controlling your thoughts and
behaviors, or nonbizarre, such as believing that one is
being watched or spied on. In addition, delusions can
be mood congruent, in which the delusion is consistent
with the emotional state—such as depression or mania,
or mood incongruent, whereby the delusion is not con-
sistent with the emotional state. An example of a
mood-congruent delusion would be believing oneself
to be God during the height of a manic episode; an192 ———DelusionsD-Cutler (Encyc)-45463.qxd 11/18/2007 12:41 PM Page 192