had made a suspect identification as compared with
only 28% of the older age group (aged 40 years plus).
There were no differences in the rates of identifications
of the stand-ins or foils (innocent persons. in a police
lineup). In most cases, the suspects were young adults,
and there is some evidence that older adults do less well
with younger faces (as compared with older faces), at
least in situations where the perpetrator is not present
in the lineup. In other words, older adults might have
some advantage when recognizing faces that are closer
in age to themselves.
Finally, stereotypes of elderly witnesses have been
examined in simulated jury studies conducted by Liz
Brimacombe in Canada. Participant jurors were pre-
sented with the videotaped testimony of young and
older witnesses. In one study, older seniors were less
accurate in their responses to direct and cross-examina-
tion questions but were not rated as less credible than
younger seniors or younger adults. A later study con-
firmed that senior witnesses (70-year-olds) did provide
less accurate testimony than younger adults (20-year-
olds). Jurors were able to spot this and hence rated the
seniors as less credible. However, age stereotypes did
not bias the judgments of jurors. Further analysis
showed that the witnesses (young and old) who were
rated as most credible had provided fewer negative
qualifiers (e.g., “I think, but I am not sure.. .”). Thus,
what a witness actually says and their confidence,
rather than their age, may be more important determi-
nants of credibility.
Amina Memon
See also Cognitive Interview; Exposure Time and Eyewitness
Memory; False Memories; Identification Tests, Best
Practices in; Juries and Eyewitnesses; Mug Shots; Retention
Interval and Eyewitness Memory; Source Monitoring and
Eyewitness Memory; Unconscious Transference
Further Readings
Balota, D. A., Dolan, P., & Duchek, J. (2000). Memory
changes in healthy older adults. In E. Tulving &
F. I. M. Craik (Eds.),The Oxford handbook of memory
(pp. 395–425). New York: Oxford University Press.
Brimacombe, C. A., Quinton, N., Nance, N., & Garrioch,
L. (1997). Is age irrelevant? Perceptions on young and old
adult witnesses. Law and Human Behavior, 21,619–634.
Memon, A., Bartlett, J. C., Rose, R., & Gray, C. (2003). The
aging eyewitness: The effects of face-age and delay upon
younger and older observers. Journal of Gerontology:
Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 58,338–345.
END-OF-LIFEISSUES
As the range of options for extending life and for has-
tening death continues to expand, so the range of
issues faced by clinical evaluators also has grown.
Among the most complex are those surrounding
requests for assisted suicide,euthanasia, or the with-
drawal or refusal of life-sustaining interventions. The
availability of some of these alternatives varies by
jurisdiction and medical condition, although all per-
sons are afforded the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment. However, like all treatment decisions,
requests to hasten death depend on the patient’s deci-
sion-making competence. Forensic evaluators have
increasingly been asked to participate in competency
evaluations, particularly around end-of-life treatment
decisions. For the patient who is incompetent to make
treatment decisions, advance directives can help deter-
mine the course of end-of-life treatment and help pre-
serve the patient’s autonomy. But advance directives
often raise a new set of questions regarding exactly
when the directive should be implemented and, if a
health care proxy has not been appointed, who should
make treatment decisions. As public debates regarding
legalized suicide or euthanasia progress, these issues
will likely become even more important.
Defining Clinical/Legal Issues
at the End of Life
This following section defines key terms and concepts
pertaining to end-of-life decision making, including
physician-assisted suicide (PAS), euthanasia, do-not-
resuscitate (DNR) orders, and advance directives.
Perhaps the most controversial of these issues are PAS
and euthanasia. Both these interventions involve
actions that directly lead to a hastened death in a seri-
ously ill person; however, they vary in the nature of
the clinician’s involvement. In PAS, the clinician pro-
vides assistance and guidance, typically in the form of
a prescription for medication that the patient can use
if he or she chooses to commit suicide. Of key impor-
tance, it is the patient and not the physician who ulti-
mately administers a lethal dose of medication. In
1997, this practice was legalized in Oregon, resulting
in fierce public debate. Euthanasia, on the other hand,
involves the intentional administration of a lethal
medication by the clinician(presumably in response
to a patient’s request) for the sole purpose of ending
life. In 1998, one of the leading proponents of
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