states. Indeed, this task, perhaps more than any other,
tends to be handled by court-appointed experts.
Commentary on the Probative
Value of Other Evidence
A large segment of psychological expertise is devoted
to the subject of how people ordinarily respond, men-
tally and behaviorally, to different sets of circum-
stances. For example, research on domestic violence
indicates that many victims of such abuse fail to leave
battering relationships for a variety of psychological
and sociological reasons. Similarly, research on victims
of rape and sexual assault indicates that many of them
do not report the crime immediately, again for a variety
of reasons. In the law, this kind of research might be
relevant on a couple of related issues. Specifically, it is
sometimes offered to buttress the credibility of a wit-
ness. For instance, this research might suggest that an
alleged victim of sexual assault is not an untruthful wit-
ness because he or she failed to report the crime in a
timely fashion, since it is not unusual for sexual assault
victims to delay reporting. This sort of testimony is also
proffered for the more general purpose of giving triers
of fact background information regarding the usual cir-
cumstances that surround similar situations. For exam-
ple, triers of fact might be informed in a case involving
a defendant who was battered that a large percentage of
battered women do not leave abusive situations. Courts’
receptivity to these uses varies.
In most jurisdictions, evidence cannot be intro-
duced for the specific purpose of buttressing the cred-
ibility of a witness. Courts consider the use of
evidence to support a witness’s credibility to be an
invasion of the province of the jury. Juries are
entrusted with the task of assessing credibility. At the
same time, however, many courts allow expert testi-
mony regarding how people tend to respond to partic-
ular situations for the purpose of educating the jury
regarding the background context confronted by the
testifying witness. Three basic contexts arise with
regard to this kind of evidence. In some cases, such as
sexual assault cases, psychological evidence is prof-
fered not to show that a witness is truthful but to
demonstrate that, in light of how other people respond
in similar situations, the witness’ account is not unbe-
lievable. In the second, the expert does not speak to
the credibility of a witness but is offered to inform the
jury regarding the likely accuracy of a witness’s testi-
mony. In the third group, experts are offered to speak
to credibility directly, usually through the use of a test
such as a polygraph. These three contexts will be con-
sidered in turn.
In many cases, especially including rape cases and
sexual assault of children, psychological expertise is
proffered to show that the alleged victim’s behavior is
not inconsistent with that of others who have experi-
enced similar trauma. Evidence, for example, that an
alleged rape victim failed to immediately report the
crime might be put into perspective by expert testi-
mony that many sexual assault victims behave simi-
larly. This can be important evidence in a case in
which the defendant claims consent because the wit-
ness’s behavior might otherwise appear inconsistent
with having been assaulted. In this view, evidence on
the reporting rates of sexual assault are not offered to
support the credibility of the witness but to inform the
jury about how people tend to respond to similar situ-
ations. As many courts and commentators have
observed, however, there is a very fine line—if any
line at all—between the permitted purpose of rebut-
ting the defendant’s contention that the victim’s
behavior is inconsistent with having been assaulted
and the prohibited purpose of supporting the prosecu-
tion’s contention that the victim’s behavior is consis-
tent with having been assaulted. It is illogical to
permit expert evidence to prove nonconsent but not to
prove that a rape occurred (i.e., in most cases, non-
consent). But most courts adhere to this distinction.
The second group of cases is not overly controver-
sial as regards invading the trier of fact’s province to
decide witness credibility, because it principally con-
cerns the general accuracy of similarly situated wit-
nesses. The lion’s share of this type involves expert
opinion on the reliability of eyewitness identification.
(Expert testimony on implantation of false memories
in repressed-memory cases would be another exam-
ple.) Courts rarely raise the credibility objection to this
evidence for a couple of reasons. First, a principled
line can be drawn between credibility and accuracy,
and the latter seems less invasive of the jury function.
Second, eyewitness experts usually do not testify
regarding the accuracy of a particular witness but,
instead, only to the general factors that might interfere
with eyewitness accuracy. Again, this form of testi-
mony is less invasive. Nonetheless, courts have not
been enthusiastic admirers of psychological expertise
on the unreliability of eyewitnesses. Objections to this
sort of expert testimony typically involve the question
whether the information is “beyond the ken” of the
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