the methods used by an expert must be generally
accepted within the expert’s field. In the court’s opin-
ion, the lie detection test Frye wished to introduce to
trial had not gained recognition among other experts in
the field, and this was grounds for its exclusion.
The court established the Fryetest to ensure that
unreliable expert testimony was not admitted at trial, in
part because of concerns that jurors would be unable to
differentiate between good and bad science. Rather
than relying on trial court judges or on jurors to make
determinations about the value or reliability of expert
evidence,Fryeleaves the responsibility of evaluating
the reliability of novel scientific methods to the relevant
scientific community. If there is a significant dispute in
the relevant scientific community over the reliability of
a theory or practice, then the court could choose to
exclude the evidence. Essentially, the court placed the
responsibility of ensuring that valid science entered the
court on the practitioners in the field.
Over time, the Fryetest became the primary stan-
dard that the courts used to evaluate the introduction
of scientific evidence. However, dissatisfaction with
the Fryestandard began to grow as opponents argued
that Fryewas too vague and that it prevented novel
scientific discoveries from being admitted in trial
because there had not been sufficient time for the dis-
covery to become generally accepted. As expert testi-
mony became increasingly common in courts, it
became apparent that more structured guidelines
would have to be created. Finally, 50 years after the
Fryestandard had been established, new rules govern-
ing the admissibility of expert evidence were adopted
in the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE).Federal Rules of Evidence
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, an advisory commit-
tee convened by then Chief Justice Earl Warren drafted
new rules to govern the admissibility of evidence in all
federal courts. These rules, known as the FRE, were
eventually adopted by the Supreme Court and, with
modification, enacted into legislation by Congress in- Article VII of these rules addressed the admissi-
bility of expert testimony specifically. Rule 702 states
that “if scientific, technical or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact” in weighing the evi-
dence or determining facts, and the expert proffering
such testimony has been qualified as an expert based on
his or her “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education,” then the jury should be allowed to hear
the testimony. Thus, the rule states that experts do not
necessarily have to come from a scientific background.
Experts can come from groups that have a certain skill,
such as bankers or plumbers, when that skill or experi-
ence allows them to form an opinion that assists the
trier of fact in understanding the evidence. Moreover,
expert testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact in
determining facts at issue in the trial. Although these
rules were designed to apply only in federal courts,
many states modeled their own rules of evidence on the
federal rules, including Rule 702.DDaauubbeerrtt vv.. MMeerrrreellll
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As concerns grew over the admissibility of expert evi-
dence, which began to play a larger role in many
cases, questions arose about which standard should be
used to determine the admissibility. Some federal
courts continued to rely on the Frye standard, whereas
other federal courts relied on the FRE when making
determinations about the admissibility of expert evi-
dence. The decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals(1993) addressed these concerns by
clarifying specifically what standards should be used
when admitting expert testimony.
The petitioners in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals (1993) were two children, Jason Daubert and
Eric Schuller, who were born with serious birth defects,
and their parents, who were appealing a trial court’s rul-
ing that excluded expert testimony supporting the posi-
tion that the drug Bendectin could be a teratogen. Their
initial suit alleged that the children’s birth defects had
been caused by their mother’s use of an antinausea
drug, Benedectin, manufactured by Merrell Dow, dur-
ing her pregnancies. To support their position, the
plaintiffs proffered eight experts who based their con-
clusions that Bendectin was a teratogen on both test-
tube and live studies on animals that demonstrated
a relationship between Bendectin and birth defects,
research showing that Bendectin had a similar chemical
structure to other drugs known to cause birth defects,
and a meta-analysis of published epidemiological
studies that examined the rate of birth defects among
children born to women who had used Bendectin
versus those who had not. Merrell Dow proffered
a highly qualified expert who stated that he had
reviewed all the literature surrounding Bendectin and
human teratogens and found that there was no evidence
to support its being responsible for the birth defects.
The District Court granted a summary judgment
for Merrell Dow and dismissed the case, writing that272 ———Expert Psychological Testimony, Admissibility StandardsE-Cutler (Encyc)-45463.qxd 11/18/2007 12:42 PM Page 272