states are either considering or in the process of mak-
ing similar revisions (including Delaware, Iowa,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota Arizona,
Florida, Vermont, and Washington). It is hoped that in
the future, continued assessment and revision of
instructions accompanied by the application of theo-
retical perspectives from cognitive and social psychol-
ogy will continue to improve the jury instruction
process, leading to verdicts that are based on a true
understanding of the law by jurors.
Joel D. Lieberman
See alsoDamage Awards; “Dynamite Charge”; Inadmissible
Evidence, Impact on Juries; Jury Nullification; Jury
Understanding of Judges’ Instructions in Capital Cases
Further Readings
Ellsworth, P. C., & Reifman, A. (2000). Juror comprehension
and public policy: Perceived problems and proposed
solutions. Psychology, Public Policy, & Law, 6,788–821.
Elwork, A., Sales, B. D., & Alfini, J. J. (1982). Making jury
instructions understandable.Charlottesville, VA: Michie.
Finkel, N. J. (2000). Commonsense justice and jury
instructions: Instructive and reciprocating connections.
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 6,591–628.
Greene, E., & Bornstein, B. (2000). Precious little guidance:
Jury instruction on damage awards. Psychology, Public
Policy and Law, 6,743–768.
Lieberman, J. D., & Sales, B. D. (1997). What social sciences
teaches us about the jury instruction process. Psychology,
Public Policy, and Law, 3,1–56.
Ogloff, J. R. P., & Rose, V. G. (2005). The comprehension of
judicial instructions. In N. Brewer & K. D. Williams
(Eds.),Psychology and law: An empirical perspective
(pp. 407–444). New York: Guilford Press.
JURYADMINISTRATIONREFORMS
Over the past half-century, courts have implemented a
host of reforms to the administrative processes
involved in qualifying and summoning prospective
jurors for jury service. These reforms have largely
focused on improving the demographic representation
of the jury pool and alleviating the burden of jury ser-
vice on citizens. This entry describes the legal and
theoretical basis for administrative reforms and the
specific efforts that courts have made to ensure that
the jury pool is broadly inclusive of the entire popula-
tion and reflects a fair cross-section of the community.
Legal and Theoretical Basis
for Administrative Reforms
The U.S. Supreme Court first ruled that African
Americans could not be systematically excluded from
the jury pool on the basis of race in 1880, but wide-
spread efforts to ensure a demographically representa-
tive jury pool began in earnest only with the civil rights
and women’s rights movements during the mid-20th
century. The legal principle requiring a racially and
ethnically diverse jury pool derives mainly from the
Sixth Amendment requirement that criminal defen-
dants be tried by “a fair and impartial jury,” which the
U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted as a jury selected
from “a fair cross-section of the community.”
The principle is premised on the belief that a jury
that reflects a broad spectrum of life experiences and
viewpoints is less likely to succumb to unchallenged
assumptions or biases during deliberations. This
understanding is supported by a substantial body of
empirical research concerning the implications of the
story model of juror decision making, which posits
that jurors filter trial evidence as it is presented through
a preexisting framework of life experiences, opinions,
and attitudes (e.g., how the world works, how people
interact, etc.), which in turn affects the inferences that
each juror takes away from that evidence. During
deliberations, jurors have the opportunity to present
competing interpretations of evidence and discuss their
credibility in the context of the entire case and come to
a consensus about the facts and the appropriate appli-
cation of law to those facts in their verdicts. Due to the
widespread public acceptance of this premise, courts
have also justified administrative reforms to the jury
system to bolster public perceptions of the fairness and
legitimacy of jury verdicts produced by diverse and
representative juries.
A secondary principle—tangentially related to the
first—is that jury service is a civic obligation that all
citizens must be prepared to undertake if the American
justice system is to continue to uphold its democratic
ideals. This principle derives less from specific con-
stitutional requirements and more from the belief that
a well-functioning democracy engages citizens across
every dimension of cultural identity, socioeconomic
status, and political orientation in a process of shared
decision making. Thus, no segment of society should
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