particularly in criminal juries. Forepersons tend to be
White, male, better educated, seated at the end of the
table, and the first to speak or the first to identify the
need to select a foreperson. This profile suggests that
juries tend to eschew confrontation and rely on stereo-
types and subtle interpersonal cues (such as seating
and order of speaking) to identify a “natural leader.”
Only two task-relevant characteristics have been
found to be associated with forepersons: They tend to
have previous experience as jurors, and they some-
times have a relevant occupational background in civil
settings (e.g., an accountant being chosen in a trial
featuring complex financial transactions). Much of the
research on forepersons was conducted before 1970,
however, and it is unclear if the findings related to a
foreperson’s demographic characteristics still hold in
the wake of systematic efforts to increase the demo-
graphic diversity of juries as well as significant
changes in societal attitudes over the last 40 years.SSppeeaakkiinngg aanndd DDiissccuussssiioonn CCoonntteenntt
In general, research has shown that speaking during
deliberation is not spread evenly across jurors—several
individuals tend to do the lion’s share of the talking,
while a few members typically say little or nothing
(especially in larger juries). As might be expected,
forepersons generally speak more than the typical juror.
Although there has been a pervasive fear that juries will
get sidetracked easily and end up spending much of
their time talking about irrelevant topics, this apprehen-
sion appears to be unfounded. A robust finding has
been that juries (both real and mock) take their jobs
very seriously and try to stay focused on the task at
hand. Indeed, most of the deliberation time is taken up
with discussion of legally relevant topics, such as the
evidence (around 75%) and the jury’s instructions
(around 20%). Juries also generally do a good job of
correcting inaccurate statements made by their mem-
bers, exhibiting good collective recall. Furthermore,
when individual jurors introduce legally irrelevant con-
siderations (e.g., the similarities between the current
trial and a recent movie), this is often noted and sanc-
tioned (corrected) by other members.Initial Distribution of
Verdict Preferences
One of the strongest and most reliable findings about
juries is that the distribution of verdict preferences at
the beginning of deliberation is a very good predictorof the jury’s ultimate verdict. Specifically, the verdict
option favored by the initial majority tends to be the
jury’s final verdict about 90% of the time. This find-
ing is based on extensive research with mock juries
where individuals were asked to provide an explicit
verdict preference prior to deliberation, as well as
several field studies where the first vote was recon-
structed later and used as a proxy for the initial
preference distribution in real trials. This robust phe-
nomenon has often been referred to as the “majority
effect.”
A good deal of research on “social decision
schemes” in the 1970s and 1980s aimed to identify
the specific probabilities associated with the various
verdicts that occurred given every possible initial dis-
tribution of juror verdict preferences. Early studies
suggested that factions within the jury would usually
“succeed” in getting their preferred verdict in the end
if they began with a strong majority or a higher share
of the vote (defined as two-thirds or more). If no two-
thirds majority existed initially, juries were theorized
to acquit or hang with high probability. Subsequent
work provided support for the majority effect but also
identified an asymmetry in the probabilities working
in favor of the defendant in criminal trials—a
so-called leniency effect. The leniency effect essen-
tially corresponds to an increase in the likelihood of
a prodefense verdict for any given preference distrib-
ution relative to what would be expected if the nature
of the verdict had no impact on the majority’s chance
of succeeding. For example, a weak majority of
7 people in a 12-person jury is considerably more
likely to succeed if it favors acquittal as opposed to
conviction. This prodefense shift is consistent with
the explicit value placed on giving the defendant the
benefit of the doubt in criminal trials and the strict
standard of proof needed to convict (i.e., “beyond a
reasonable doubt”).
Consistent with both the majority and the leniency
effects noted above, a recent meta-analysis of studies
measuring early-verdict preference distributions (i.e.,
predeliberation or first vote) and final verdicts in
criminal trials identified two critical thresholds of
member support related to potential verdicts. When
there existed a strong early majority favoring convic-
tion (i.e., 75% or more of the jury), a “guilty” verdict
was the usual result. Conversely, if 50% or less of the
jury initially supported conviction, a “not guilty” ver-
dict was extremely likely. The only time the jury’s
final verdict could not be forecasted correctly was
when a weak initial majority favored conviction, inJury Deliberation——— 409J-Cutler (Encyc)-45463.qxd 11/18/2007 12:43 PM Page 409