26 Waltz characterises neorealism as ‘the basic theory of international relations’ (‘Structural
realism after the Cold War’, p. 41). In an exchange with Keohane, Waltz remarks on the
two most prominent alternative theories, liberal institutionalism and constructivism, that
one is really a branch of his theory, and that the other is not a theory at all.
27 For these four criteria – which roughly lead to similar results – see respectively Ole
Wæver, ‘Still a discipline after all these debates?’ in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve
Smith (eds) IR Theories: Discipline and Diversity?(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007),
pp. 288–308; Thomas J. Biersteker, ‘The parochialism of hegemony: challenges for
“American” International Relations’, in Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver (eds),
International Relations Scholarship around the World(London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 307–26;
Richard Jordan, Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes and Susan Peterson, ‘One discipline or
many? 2008 TRIP survey of International Relations faculty in ten countries’, Reves
Center for Arts and Sciences, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, February
2009; and for the fourth criterion there is so far no solid documentation, mostly rumours
and general tribal knowledge. Among the mainstream, some rational choice modellers
are those least guilty of de-Waltzification.
28 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific
Inference in Qualitative Research(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.
29 Kenneth N. Waltz, TIP, p. 5.
30 Post-positivists and scientific realists will object that Waltz’s understanding of ‘laws’ is
problematic or even positivist. (In the typical critiques of Waltz that ignore his arguments
about theory, his notion of laws is emphasised to depict him as more positivist than
reasonably the case.) True: Waltz presents laws in a traditional Humean sense as regularity
in relations between variables: if a, then b. But this has much less importance than one
should think. His main line is to downgrade the trust in laws, and upgrade the importance
of theory. The link between theory and law is loosened, and his main project is radically
anti-inductivist. Thus the formulations about laws are partly polemical to sharpen their
contrast to theory. A serious understanding of Waltz’s theoryhas to focus on his
understanding of – theory!
31 Here scientific realists will object that Waltz unfortunately uses positivist language, even
when his intention is to construct an anti-empiricist and anti-inductivist understanding
of theory. The theoretical notions move away from ‘sense experience’. To a realist they
move closer to something at least as real: the actual forces and tendencies that drive events
and form the basis of experiences. However, in relation to the advice for scientific
practice, the difference in terminology matters less than scientific realists expect.
32 Waltz, TIP, p. 6.
33 Waltz, TIP, pp.6ff.
34 Waltz, TIP, p. 7.
35 Waltz, TIP, p. 8; cf. Waltz, ‘Evaluating Theories’, p. 913, and the interviews with
Kreisler,‘Theory’, and Ole Wæver and Ingvar Sejr Hansen, ‘Teori, Praksis og fredelige
Atomvåben’ (‘Theory, Praxis, and Peaceful Nukes’), Universitetsavisen, 11 June 2005,
available at: http://universitetsavisen.ku.dk/dokument9/nyhedsarkiv/2005/2005-
06/050611h/. In TIP, this sentence ends with a reference ‘(cf. Boltzman 1905)’. It should
be Boltzmann(see references in notes 39 and 40 below).
36 Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study
of International Relations(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Stacie E. Goddard and
Daniel H. Nexon, ‘Paradigm lost? Reassessing theory of International Politics’, European
Journal of International Relations, 11 (1), 2005, pp. 9–61.
37 Waltz, TIP,p. 9.
38 Waltz, ‘Ten Works’,p. 103.
39 Ludwig Boltzmann, ‘On the significance of theories’ (1890), in L. Boltzmann Theoretical
Physics and Philosophical Problems: Selected Writings (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974), pp. 33–6,
quotation from p. 33.
40 Henk W. de Regt, ‘Ludwig Boltzmann’s Bildtheorieand scientific understanding’,
Synthese,119 (1-2), 1999, pp. 113–34 (and other articles in this special issue of Synthese).
Waltz’s theory of theory 85