Structural realism has little to say about this because it lacks a developed theory
of sovereign states and consequently a theory of changes in statehood; it is wedded
to a view of sovereign states as ontological givens; states are by definition ‘the
constitutive components of the international system. Sovereignty is an order based
on territorial control. The international system is anarchical. It is a self-help system’.^22
But states are not by definition constitutive components of the international system;
they emerged to current dominance through a long process of historical develop-
ment and change; they could eventually become irrelevant again.^23 Sovereignty is
not necessarily based on actual territorial control; sovereignty is an institution that
has changed and developed over time. The international system is not by defini-
tion characterized by self-help anarchy; there are softer varieties of anarchy where
states are not compelled to self-help in the ways depicted by structural realism.^24
The following sections develop these claims, first in theoretical and then in empirical
terms.
States are not ‘like units’ and anarchy does not always mean
self-help
There is an element of state theory in Waltz’s structural realism. It proposes that
states are compelled to become ‘like units’ according to the following logic: given
that states as a minimum seek to survive, they are driven, under conditions of
anarchy, to emulate the more successful states in the system. ‘The theory says simply
that if some do relatively well, others will emulate them or fall by the wayside’.^25
Socialization and competition are the two principal ways in which the anarchic
structure affects states. Waltz draws an analogy between states in anarchy and firms
in the marketplace: ‘Those who survive share certain characteristics. Those who go
bankrupt lack them. Competition spurs the actors to accommodate their ways to
the socially most acceptable and successful practice. Socialization and competition
are two aspects of a process by which the variety of behaviours and outcomes is
reduced’.^26
The problem is that socialization and competition do not work in the way
stipulated by Waltz. For example, a pure Darwinian logic of selection cannot explain
important aspects of European state formation. There is great variation in unit size;
no convergence on an ‘optimum’ size has taken place.^27 As noted by Buzan et al.,^28
the balance of power can be constructed in such a way that it allows some weak
states to persist. That means we would have to investigate the interests and pref-
erences of great powers in any historical period to make inferences about the survival
of states in the system. Such reasoning leads away from the structural realist view of
an international system mechanically created by survival of the fittest and towards
the notion of an international society of states containing members that are ‘unlike
units’.^29
Furthermore, if competition and socialization are non-mechanical and instead
take place through actors in social processes, it is necessary to make room for the
possibility that some actors learn and adapt better than others.^30 Moreover, it must
Structural realism and changes in statehood 111