15

BEYOND WALTZ’S

NUCLEAR WORLD

More trust may be better

Nicholas J. Wheeler^1

The publication in 1981 of Kenneth Waltz’s Adelphi Paper, ‘The spread of nuclear
weapons: more may be better’, turned the conventional wisdom on its head by
arguing that the spread of nuclear weapons did not have to be a terrifying prospect.
Instead, he argued that just as nuclear weapons had played a decisive role in
preventing war between the superpowers, so it should be expected that they would
play the same role in relation to new nuclear powers. He based his thesis on the
assumption that the fear of nuclear war was so overwhelming that the leaders of
nuclear-armed states would always be deterred from going to war against each
other.^2 Against this powerful case (repeated in various forms since) this chapter
rejects the Waltzian proposition that fear of nuclear destruction can serve as a
permanent basis of international order. It argues, instead, that lasting order depends
upon the building of trust between the nuclear-armed and arming, and disarming,
powers. By trust I mean a situation where

two or more actors, based on the mutual interpretation of each other’s

attitudes and behaviour, believe that the other(s) now and in the future, can

be relied upon [at a minimum] to desist from acting in ways that will be

injurious to their interests and values [and at a maximum] ... promote each

other’s interests and values.^3

The concept of trust has been marginalised in the theory and practice of
international relations, and this has had negative consequences for exploring viable
alternatives to a nuclear-armed world.^4 For the most part, the mainstream has
conceded the view that because of the inescapable uncertainties that confront
governments about the motives and intentions of others – the security dilemma –
it is dangerous to trust in the peaceful intentions of states that have the capabilities
to inflict great harm, as trust can prove to be misplaced.^5 The chapter argues that