that the other was only pursuing a peaceful nuclear programme. From a trust-
building perspective, three factors seem to have been decisive to the cooperation
that was achieved between Argentina and Brazil in relation to the nuclear issue: (1)
mutual sensitivity to the dangers of spiralling mistrust (‘security dilemma sensibility’,
to be discussed below) on the part of key leaders and diplomats; (2) recognition that
moves to promote trust entail an acceptance of both uncertainty and vulnerability;
and (3) the development of common interests and shared values at both the elite
and inter-societal levels.
Security dilemma sensibility
A key precondition for developing trust between two antagonists is that decision-
makers on both sides come to appreciate that others might be acting out of fear
and not malevolence, and, crucially, that each side recognises the role that their
own actions have played in provoking that fear. Such sensitivity on the part of
leaders to fear-based hostility may be called ‘security dilemma sensibility’.^47 In the
Argentine–Brazilian case there is evidence that successive leaders were not only able
to exercise such empathetic responsiveness to each other’s security concerns, but
also used this knowledge to develop policies that signalled their mutual trust-
worthiness.^48 In the late 1970s, there were anxieties in Buenos Aires – and especially
also in Washington – that a nuclear deal between Brazil and West Germany might
signal Brasilia’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons. Recognising the dangers
ofa regional nuclear arms race, and believing that this could be averted, key
Argentinean officials, led by the ambassador to Brazil, Oscar Camiliòn (he was
ambassador from 1976 to 1981) publicly emphasised their confidence in the peaceful
intentions of the Brazilian programme.^49 This expression of trust in Brazil’s nuclear
motives was reciprocated in Brasilia’s acceptance of the peaceful nature of the
Argentine nuclear programme. These moves paved the way, along with the 1979
Corpus-Itaipú agreement (which resolved the dispute between Argentina and Brazil
over the use of the river Paraná’s water resources), for a decisive breakthrough in
- During that year, reciprocal presidential visits led to the signing of a number
of agreements, including one that was highly significant in establishing cooperation
on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.^50
The nuclear rapprochement faltered in the early 1980s as both counties focused
on internal economic and political problems, and Argentina fought a war against the
United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands. However, the rapprochement dramat-
ically accelerated with the transition to civilian rule in both countries. The human
factor was also crucial^51 as can be seen in the reflections of the Argentine diplomat
Julio C. Carasales who witnessed the process of growing nuclear cooperation at first
hand. He told a conference in 1996 that the personal commitment of Raùl Alfonsín
(elected head of state in Argentina in 1983) and José Sarnay (elected as Brazilian
president two years later) and the active participation of their key advisers was a key
factor in the building of trust.^52
Beyond Waltz’s nuclear world 257