CONTROLLING THE BUREAUCRACY| 343Controlling the Bureaucracy
As the expert implementers of legislation and presidential directives, bureaucrats
hold signifi cant power to infl uence government policy. This situation creates the
problem of political control illustrated by the principal–agent game: elected offi -
cials must fi gure out how to reap the benefi ts of bureaucratic expertise without
simply giving bureaucrats free rein to do whatever they want.
One strategy is to take away discretion and give bureaucrats simple, direct
orders. For example, after NASA scientist James Hansen gave a speech in 2006
calling for policies to combat global warming that did not refl ect the Bush admin-
istration’s preferences, he was told to submit all future papers, lectures, and
interview requests to NASA political appointees for review.^55 In this case, NASA
reversed the order after it received press attention, and the agency’s head released
a statement supporting scientifi c openness.^56 Soon after this episode, however,
NASA’s offi cial mission statement was modifi ed to exclude studies of Earth,
thereby choking off its studies of climate change entirely.^57
Such attempts to control the bureaucracy are common. The problem with elimi-
nating bureaucrats’ discretion is that it limits the positive infl uence of their exper-
tise. Particularly when new policies are being developed, taking away bureaucratic
discretion is costly for legislators or presidential appointees, as it forces them to
work out the policy details themselves—and it may produce less eff ective policies
than those constructed by bureaucrats with specialized knowledge.^58 Moreover,
preventing bureaucrats from using their judgment makes it impossible for them
to craft policies that take into account new developments or unforeseen circum-
stances.^59 Directives may also make it impossible for bureaucrats to develop and
implement policies incrementally (over time) as opposed to all at once.^60 Incre-
mentalism is a good strategy when policies are complex and no one is sure what the
impact of new regulations will be, but directives from elected offi cials to develop
and implement regulations as fast as possible can make this strategy impossible.
For all these reasons, elected offi cials must fi nd ways to reduce or eliminate
bureaucratic drift (that is, bureaucrats pursuing their own goals rather than
their assignments from offi ceholders or appointees) while still reaping the ben-
efi ts of bureaucratic expertise. This section describes two common strategies:
changing the way agencies are organized and staff ed, and using standardized pro-
cedures for monitoring agency actions.
Agency Organization
Political scientists have shown how agencies can be organized to minimize
bureaucratic drift.^61 Specifi cally, when an agency is set up or given new responsi-
bilities, the offi cials who initiated the change don’t simply tell the agency what to
do. To ensure that they get the policies they want, they also determine where the
agency is located within the federal government structure and who runs it. These
eff orts may occur solely within Congress, or involve both Congress and the presi-
dent, or be arranged by presidential actions.^62
For example, when legislation was written to form the Department of Home-
land Security in 2002, the Bush administration pushed to have the Coast Guard
EXPLAIN HOW CONGRESS
AND THE PRESIDENT
OVERSEE THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCHbureaucratic drift Bureaucrats’
tendency to implement policies in
a way that favors their own political
objectives rather than following the
original intentions of the legislation.