THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS AND CIVIL RIGHTS| 405
in an intentionally discriminatory way.^31 This rule encouraged
“white fl ight” from the cities to the suburbs in response to
court-ordered busing.
The Supreme Court retreated further from enforcing deseg-
regation in 1991 when it ruled that a school district could be
released from a court-ordered desegregation plan if the district
had taken “all practicable steps” to desegregate. Furthermore,
districts do not have to address segregation in public schools
that is caused by segregated housing.^32 The Court ruled in 1995
that low minority achievement scores are not evidence of a dis-
trict’s failure to desegregate, and it said that school districts can-
not be forced by the courts to spend money to establish magnet
schools with special programs that could attract white students
from the suburbs.^33 In a signifi cant recent decision, in 2007 the
Court invalidated voluntary desegregation plans implemented
by public school districts in Seattle and Louisville. Both dis-
tricts set goals for racial diversity and denied assignment requests if they tipped the
racial balance above or below certain thresholds. In these cases, the discrimination
was against white students who wanted to be in schools with few minority students
rather than black students who wanted to be in integrated schools.^34
EXPANDING CIVIL RIGHTS
Other signifi cant rulings struck down state laws that forbid interracial marriages
(16 states had such laws), upheld all signifi cant parts of the Civil Rights Act, and
expanded the scope of the Voting Rights Act. The central cases ruled that Con-
gress had the power to eliminate segregation in public places, such as restaurants
and hotels, under the commerce clause of the Constitution.
One important area of cases was in employment law. In 1971 the Court ruled
that employment tests, such as written exams or general aptitude tests, that are not
related to job performance and that discriminate against blacks violate the 1964
Civil Rights Act.^35 The burden of proof was on the employer to show that the test was
a “reasonable measure of job performance” and not simply an excuse to exclude Afri-
can Americans from certain jobs. Under this standard, the intent of the company or
person who is discriminating does not matter; whether the practice has an adverse
eff ect on a racial group is the key point. This decision had a tremendous impact on
integrating the workplace. In 1989, however, the Supreme Court reversed itself and
placed the burden of proof on the employee to show that the discriminatory practice
did not result from a business necessity.^36 This ruling made it much more diffi cult to
prove workplace discrimination, and Congress subsequently overruled the Court on
the issue, as discussed later in the chapter. (See also Nuts and Bolts 13.1.)
THE COLOR-BLIND COURT AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Over the past two decades the Court has been gradually imposing a “color-blind
jurisprudence” over numerous issues. One signifi cant area was the 1992 racial
redistricting in which 15 new U.S. House districts were drawn to help elect African
Americans and 10 districts were drawn to help elect Latino members. The resulting
dramatic change in the number of minorities in Congress (more than 50 percent)
was rooted in the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. Instead of mandating
a fair process, this law and subsequent interpretation by the Supreme Court man-
dated that minorities be able to “elect representatives of their choice” when their
A FIFTEEN-YEAR-OLD CIVIL RIGHTS
demonstrator, defying an anti-
parade ordinance, is attacked
by a police dog in Birmingham,
Alabama, on May 3, 1963. The
next day, during a meeting at the
White House, President Kennedy
discussed this photo, which had
appeared on the front page of the
New York Times. Reaction against
this police brutality helped spur
Congress and the president to
enact civil rights legislation.