The opposition between philosophy and other persua-
sive uses of words thus proves to be the organizing polarity of
thePhaedrus,not the opposition between speech and writing,
as Derrida claims. Whether someone prefers the rhetoric of
the courts of law and the political arena or the conversational
ways of philosophy tells us something about this individual’s
soul: so Plato’s Phaedrusbecomes a means to the reader’s self-
knowledge.
In contrast to Plato’s philosophical psychology, the op-
posing art of the sophist requires from its audience a certain
degree of ignorance. The Phaedrussuggests that sophistic
rhetoric’s esteem for its be-all and end-all, effectiveness, re-
quires the separation of technique from belief. You can either
be taken in by a seduction speech or marvel at the mannerisms
that the rhetorician-seducer uses. But in order to be taken in,
you must not notice the manipulation. Phaedrus, at the begin-
ning of the dialogue, is in awe of Lysias’s speech, a nonlover’s
attempt to seduce a beautiful boy by claiming that he is supe-
rior to the lover. But Phaedrus does not for a moment believe
in Lysias’s argument. The implied point is that if you know
Lysias’s rhetorical tactics, you can protect yourself from his art.
The sophist’s ideal is to deceive his audience, and to teach his
technique to similar deceivers. The sophist resembles a magi-
cian who convinces a credulous audience by means of con-
cealed expertise. When the expertise is revealed to a connois-
seur like Phaedrus, the persuasive power is lost. Plato, by
contrast, draws a firm line between philosophy and mere de-
ception, even when he advocates a deception like the Repub-
lic’s noble lie; the reader of the dialogues, who is meant to be
puzzled by the relation between dialectics and mythmaking,
can never be simply taken in by such a lie.
The sophistic rhetorician’s distinguishing of technique
154 Plato, Austin, Nietzsche, Freud