definition. Plato’s boy-loving rhetorician, Austin’s bigamist or
welsher, Nietzsche’s manipulative woman: all are minor case
studies essential to these thinkers’ arguments. Instead of fo-
cusing on the motives ascribed to such characters and on
our reaction to them, Derrida emphasizes writing itself (in
Plato), “woman” herself (in Nietzsche), and the prevalence of
misfiring (in Austin). In his consideration of Freud, Derrida
declares that the network of unconscious signification, rather
than the individual’s grappling with meaning, is Freud’s great
discovery. There is a pattern here: with Freud, as with the oth-
ers, Derrida elides the question of character in favor of the
workings of différance, a force that stands behind and outside
us. He avoids the core, psychological insight.
Despite Derrida’s implication, all narratives cannot, and
should not, be seen as equally dubious in the face of the un-
conscious or the random disseminations of writing. Philoso-
phers from Plato to Freud have staked the very identity of their
thought on the role of a powerful and capable narrative: a self-
making that can be proven fit, the work of what seems like ne-
cessity. Such a story is Plato’s myth of the charioteer; and such
is Freud’s account of eros and death. In both, psyche and
philosophical impulse are joined. Derrida’s separation of the
two comes at a cost.
Plato, Austin, Nietzsche, Freud 181