by becoming seriously involved with others. The willing expo-
sure of self that occurs in such exchanges is for Gadamer the
standing risk, and source of gain, of our existence. In Ga-
damer’s account language is not about the truth or falsehood
of propositions, as Derrida charges. Instead, our words aim at
a sharing of insight.
Yet language, for all its commonality, Gadamer adds,
“never touches upon the last, insurmountable secret of the in-
dividual person” ( 22 ). A main issue for Gadamer, then, is the
difference between the common nature of meaning, built up
by the conversation that joins us together, and the fundamen-
tally elusive, even secret, identity possessed by every individ-
ual. This private identity cannot be fully comprehended in our
language, but it nevertheless shows itself every time we speak.
When he states that such a “last... secret” cannot be disclosed
yet can be demonstrated in language, Gadamer distinguishes
himself from Derrida, for whom the secret can neither be dis-
closed nor demonstrated.
Gadamer’s speech from his debate with Derrida under-
takes a careful examination of different cases of interpretation:
reading a poem; interpreting the law; giving testimony in
court; psychoanalyzing a patient. Gadamer shows himself at-
tentive to the practical differences among such everyday situa-
tions in a way that is deeply foreign to Derrida and that poses
an implicit challenge to him. As was apparent in his treatment
of Austin, Derrida rebels against the power of context to define
our words.
Gadamer’s final example is that of the psychoanalyst and
the patient. The analyst, Gadamer states, makes the patient’s
statements and actions intelligible by pulling rank: by going
behind the patient’s back and resorting to a subtext that
explains what’s really going on. This sort of decoding is an
186 Gadamer, Celan, de Man, Heidegger