12 Leaders TheEconomistJanuary8th 2022
crimes such as treason, secession, sedition and subversion.
Why bother, when the nationalsecurity lawalreadycovers
much of that ground? Chillingly, Hong Kong’ssecuritychief,
Chris Tang, says there “may still be gaps that needtobefilled”.
China, it seems, wants no loophole for politicaldissent.Never
mind that public fear of such legislation sparkeda hugeprotest
in 2003 and deterred officials from pursuingplanstogetit
passed. There will be no wavering this time.
In part to show disapproval of the clampdown,Americaand
some allies have declared a diplomatic boycott ofnextmonth’s
Winter Olympics in Beijing. They will send athletes,butnotoffi
cial envoys. That is appropriate, but it will not changeChina’s
behaviour. The party sees prodemocracy activisminHongKong
as a threat not only to stability there, but to its ruleinBeijing.
The white paper is the latest broadside in China’scampaign
to redefine democracy and portray the party asitstorchbearerandWesternversionsasa sham.OnlynowthatHongKong’sleg
islatureisfreedfromgridlock,thepartysays,andthegovern
mentisunfetteredbymayhem,canrealdemocracyflourish.
Somebusinesspeoplewillshrug.Butthedebauchingofde
mocracyalsothreatensthingstheyseeasvitaltoHongKong’s
prosperity: legal independence,regulatory fairnessand cor
poratetransparency.Firmsshouldworryaboutthegradualero
sionoftheseprinciples.Witness,forexample,China’stirades
againsttheHongKongBarAssociation’soutgoingchairman,
whohascriticisedthenationalsecuritylaw,andthegovern
ment’stakeoverofsomepowersfroma previouslyselfregulat
ingaccountants’body.Asindependentinstitutions,bitbybit,
fallundertheparty’ssway,HongKongbecomesevermorelike
themainland. “Prospects are bright for democracyin Hong
Kong,”intonedthewhitepaper.Onthecontrary,a pallhasbeen
castovera oncevibrantcity.nI
nvestors’ enthusiasmforfinancingthegreentransitionis
growing—just look at the surge of interest in theelectriccar
industry. Tesla’s shares rose by 50% in 2021;those ofcatl,
China’s battery giant, rose by 68%. Yet if you lookmoreclosely,
you will find huge problems. If the world is toreachnetzero
emissions by 2050, investment will need to morethandouble,to
$5trn a year. And fund management is rife with“greenwash
ing”. Sustainabilityrating schemes have proliferatedbut are
wildly inconsistent, while many funds mislead investorsabout
their green credentials.
To the rescue has come the European Union,whichhasde
vised a new labelling system, or taxonomy, thatsortstheecon
omy into activities it deems environmentally sustainable,from
the installation of heat pumps to the anaerobic digestionofsew
age sludge. The idea is that funds and firms will
use this to disclose what share of their activities
qualify as green, and that clarity will help un
leash a flood of capital from markets. The pro
posals have been in the works for years, and on
December 31st the European Commission circu
lated its latest thinking.
Countries have different energy sources, so
the exercise was bound to be political. Still, the
classification looks sensible. Labelling nuclear energy as
green—subject to conditions including the safe disposal of toxic
waste—has been met by howls from the Green party in Germany
(see Europe section). But nuclear can play an important part in
getting to netzero; indeed, by deeming it green only during the
transition, the taxonomy is, if anything, too timid. The plan to
label natural gas as green has been controversial, too. But the
rules reflect a hardheaded assessment that it will be a vital
transition fuel in the next decade. They treat gas projects as
green for a limited period, if they replace dirtier fossil fuels, re
ceive approval by the end of the decade and contain plans to
switch to cleaner energy sources by 2035.
The plan’s flaws lie in its bureaucratic outlook. The simplistic
nature of the labelling may lead to a purity test in which fundsexcludeassetsthataredirty.Infacta keyjobofcapitalmarketsis
toownpollutingcompaniesandmanagedowntheiremissions.
Theclassificationisstatic,whereaschangesintechnologywill
cutthecarbonintensityofsomeactivitiesandleadtoinven
tionstheclassifiershavenotenvisioned.It fitsa patternofEuro
peanclimatefinanceideasthatarewellmeaningbutmarginal,
includingusingtheEuropeanCentralBanktobuygreenbonds
(whichcouldoverstepitsmandate),andimposinggreen“stress
tests”onbanks,eventhoughthelifespanoftheirassetsisshor
terthanthehorizonforthemostdevastatingclimatechange.
Whatelsetodo?Thegoalshouldbetomakeiteasierforin
vestorstotrackthecarbonemissionsoftheirportfolios(today
thisishardtodoaccurately).Fundswithzeroemissionswould
bevirtuous,butthosethatcuttheirfootprintfastmightbeeven
better.Thiswillrequirenewdisclosure,sothat
investorscantrackemissionsandavoiddou
blecountingacrosssupplychains.Sucha sys
temwouldbesimplertoadminister,andask
lessofcountriesthatstruggletoagreeonwhat
countsasgreen.Anewglobalgreendisclosure
bodyhasbeensetupbutit needstoactfaster.
Theeu’sbroaderaimshouldbetousecar
bonpricingtoalterhowcapitalisallocated.Re
lying on investors to save the planet using a taxonomy has obvi
ous limits. Less than a third of global emissions stem from firms
that are publicly listed and controlled by institutional investors.
And investors do not have a clear incentive to be green. If you
don’t mind the stigma, owning polluting assets can be profit
able, which is why they are increasingly held privately.
By contrast, putting a price on carbon sends a signal that
reaches across the whole economy, not just into listed firms, and
fully aligns the profit motive with the objective of cutting emis
sions. The eu’s main carbonpricing scheme is the rich world’s
largest but, although work is going on to expand it, it covers only
41% of emissions. If the eu wants to lead the world by unleash
ing the power of finance to combat climate change,the carbon
market is where it should be focusing its efforts.nEurope’s new labelling schemeisnotthewaytogetcapitalismtotackleclimatechangeSustainably invested assets
under management
Global, $trn20202018201635.30.22.The meaning of green
Climate finance and greenwashing