Kissinger had been picked up by the KGB. These reports were reportedly partly supported by
Golitsyn, another Soviet defector. The late James Jesus Angleton, the CIA counter-intelligencedirector for twenty years up to 1973 was said to have been the US official who was handed
Goleniewski's report by the British. Angleton later talked a lot about Kissinger being "objectively a
Soviet agent," but that was a throw-away line by that time. It has not been established that Angleton
ever ordered an active investigation of Kissinger or ever assigned his case a codename.
Kissinger's Chinese side was very much in evidence during 1971-73 and beyond; during these years
he was obsessed with anything remotely connected with China and sought to monopolize decisions
and contacts with the highest levels of the Chinese leadership. This attitude was dictated most of all
by the British mentality and geopolitical considerations indicated above, but it is also
unquestionable that Kissinger felt a strong personal affinity for Chou Etheir group of Chinese leaders, who had been responsible for the genocide of 100,000,000 mn-Lai, Mao tse-tung, andillion (^)
of their own people after 1949.
Kissinger possessed other dimensions in addition to these, including close links to the Meyer
Lansky underworld. These will also loom large in George Bush's career.
For all of these Kissingerian enormities, Bush now became the principal spokesman. In the process,
he was to become a Kissinger clone.
The defining events in the first year of Buswith his China card. Remember that in his 1964 campaign, Bush had stated that Red China musth's UN tenure reflected Kissinger's geoplitical obsession
never be admitted to the UN and that if Peking ever obtained the Chinese seat on the Security
Council, the US must depart forthwith from the world body. This statement came back to haunt him
once or twice. His stock answer went like this: "that was 1964, a long time ago. There's been an
awful lot changed since...A person who is unwilling to admit that changes have taken place is out ofthings these days. President Nixon is not being naive in his China policy. He is recognizing the
realities of today, not the realities of seven years ago." One of the realities of 1971 was that the
bankrupt British had declared themselves to be financially unable to maintain their military
presence in the Indian Ocean and the Far East, in the area "East of Suez." Part of the timing of the
Kissinger China card was dictated by the British desire to acquire China as a counterweight toRussia and India in this vast area of the world, and also to insure a US military presence in the (^)
Indian Ocean, as seen later in the US development of an important base on the island of Diego
Garcia.
On a world tour durihis administration wanted to normalize relations with Red China and wanted the help of theng 1969, Nixon had told President Yahya Khan, the dictator of Pakistan, that
Pakistani government in exchanging messages. Regular meetings between the US and Peking had
gone on for many years in Warsaw, but what Nixon was talking about was a total reversal of US
China policy. Up until 1971, the US had recognized the government of the Republic of China on
Taiwan as the sole sovereign and legitimate authority over China. The US, unlike Britain, France,and many other western countries, had no diplomatic relations with the Peking Communist regime. (^)
The Chinese seat among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council was
held by the government in Taipei. Every year in the early autumn there was an attempt by the non-
aligned bloc to oust Taipei from the Security Council and replace them with Peking, but so far this
vote had always failed because of US arm-twisting in Latin America and the rest of the third world.One of the reasons that this arrangement had endured so long was the immense prestige of ROC
President Chiang Kai-Shek and the sentimental popularity of the Kuomintang in the United States
electorate. There still was a very powerful China lobby, which was especially strong among right-
wing Republicans of what had been the Taft and Knowland factions of the party, and which
Goldwater continued. Now, in the midst of the Vietnam war, with US strategic and economic power