Preparation for wthe summer of 1975. That was to become the Halloween massacre began in the Ford White House duringhe Ford Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan preserves a memo from Donald
Rumsfeld to Ford dated July 10, 1975, which deals with an array of possible choices for CIA
Director. Rumsfeld had polled a number of White House and administration officials and asked
them to express preferences among "outsiders to the CIA." [fn 2]
Among the officials polled by Cheney was Henry Kissinger, who suggested C. Douglas Dillon,
Howard Baker, Galvin, and Robert Roosa. Dick Cheney of the White House staff proposed Robert
Bork, followed by Bush and Lee Iacocca. Nelson Rockefeller was also for C. Douglas Dillon,
followed by Howard Baker, Conner, and James R. Schlesinger. Rumsfeld himself listed Bork,
Dillon, Iacoca, Stanley Resor, and Walter Wriston, but not Bush. The only officials putting Bush ontheir "possible" lists other than Cheney were Jack O. Marsh, a White House counselor to Ford, and
David Packard. When it came time for Rumsfeld to sum up the aggregate number of times each
person was mentioned, minus one point for each time a person had been recommended against, the
list was as follows:
Robert Bork [rejected in 1987 for the Supreme Court] White McGee Foster [John S. Foster of
PFIAB, formerly of the Department of Defense] Dillon Resor Roosa Hauge
It will be seen that Bush was not among the leading candidates, perhaps because his networks were
convinced that he was going to make another attempt for the vice-presidency and that therefore theCommerce Department or some similar post would be more suitable. The summary profile of Bush (^)
sent to Ford by Rumsfeld found that Bush had "experience in government and diplomacy" and was
"generally familiar with components of the intelligence community and their missions" while
having management experience." Under "Cons" Rumsfeld noted: "RNC post lends undesirable
political cast."
As we have seen, the CIA post was finally offered by Ford to Edward Bennett Williams, perhaps
with an eye on building a bipartisan bridge towards a powerful faction of the intelligence
community. But Williams did not want the job. Bush, originally slated for the Department of
Commerce, was given the CIA appointment.
The announcement of Bush's nomination occasioned a storm of criticism, whose themes included
the inadvisability of choosing a Watergate figure for such a sensitive post so soon after that scandal
had finally begun to subside. References were made to Bush's receipt of financial largesse from
Nixon's Townhouse fund and related operations. There was also the question of whether thedomestic CIA appparatus would get mixed up in Bush's expected campaign for the vice presidency. (^)
These themes were developed in editorials during the month of November, 1976, while Bush was
kept in Beijing by the requirements of preparing the Ford-Mao meetings of early December. To
some degree, Bush was just hanging there and slowly, slowly twisting in the wind. The slow-witted
Ford soon realized that he had been inept in summarily firing Colby, since Bush would have toremain in China for some weeks and then return to face confirmation hearings. Ford had to ask (^)
Colby to stay on in a caretaker capacity until Bush took office. The delay allowed opposition
against Bush to crystallize to some degree, but his own network was also quick to spring to his
defense.
Former CIA officer Tom Braden, writing in the Fort Lauderdale News, noted that the Bush
appointment to the CIA looked bad, and looked bad at a time when public confidence in the CIA
was so low that everything about the agency desperately needed to look good. Braden's column was
entitled "George Bush, Bad Choice for CIA Job."