the same raw intelligence being used by National Intelligence Officer Howard Stoertz's Team A.
Team B's basic conclusion was that the Soviet military preparations were not exclusively defensive,but rather represented the attempt to acquire a first-strike capability that would allow the USSR to
unleash and prevail in thermonculear war. The US would face a window of vulnerability during the
1980's. But it is clear from Pipes' own discussion of the debate that Team B [fn 53] was less
interested in the Soviet Union and its capabilities than in seizing hegemony in the intelligence and
think tank community in preparation for seizing the key posts in the Republican administration thatmight follow Carter in 1980. Pipes was livid when, at the final Team A-Team B meeting, he was
not allowed to sit at Bush's table for lunch. The argument in Team B quarters was that since the
Soviets were turning aggressive once again, the US must do everything possible to strengthen the
only staunch and reliable American ally in the Middle East or possibly anywhere in the world,
Israel. This meant not just that Israel had to be financed without stint, but that Israel had to bebrought into central America, the Far East, and Africa. There was even a design for a new NATO (^)
constructed around Israel, while junking the old NATO because it was absorbing vital US resources
needed by Israel.
By contrast, Team B supporters like Richard Perle, who served as Assistant Secretary of Defenseunder Reagan, were later bitterly hostile to the Strategic Defense Initiative, which was plainly the (^)
only rational response to the Soviet buildup, which was very real indeed. The "window of
vulnerability" argument had merit, but the policy conclusions favored by Team B had none, since
their idea of responding to the Soviet threat was, once again, to subordinate everything to Israeli
requirements.
Team A and Team B were supposed to be secret, but leaks appeared in the Boston Globe in
October. Pipes was surprised to find an even more detailed account of Team B and its grim estimate
of Soviet intent in the New York Times shortly after Christmas, but Paisley told him that Bush and
CIA official Richard Lehman had already been leaking to the press, and urged Pipes to begin tooffer some interviews of his own. [fn 54]
Typically enough, Bush appeared on Face the Nation early in the new year to say that he was
"appalled" by the leaks of Team B's conclusions. Bush confessed that "outside expertise has
enormous appeal to me." He refused to discuss the Team B conclusions themselves, but did say thathe wanted to "gun down" speculation that the CIA had leaked a tough estimate of the USSR's
military buildup in order to stop Carter from cutting the defense budget. That speculation "just
couldn't be further from the truth," said Bush, who was thus caught lying neither for the first nor last
time in his existence. As if by compulsive association, Bush went on: "That gets to the integrity of
the process. And I am here to defend the integrity of the intelligence process. The CIA has greatintegrity. It would never take directions from a policymaker-- me or anybody else--in order to come (^)
up with conclusions to force a President-elect's hand or a President's hand," pontificated Bush with
Olympian hypocrisy.
For his part, Henry Kissinger, within a year or two, in an interview with the London Eembraced key aspects of the Team B position. conomist,
Congress soon got into the act, and George Bush testified at a closed hearing of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on January 18, 1977. It turned out that Team B and its "worst-case" scenario
enjoyed strong support from Hubert Humphrey, Clifford Cabecame clear that Adlai Stevenson, the chiarman of the Senate Intelligence Committeese, and Jacob Javits. Later it also
Subcommittee on Collection, Production, and Quality of Intelligence was also supportive of Team
B, along with many other senators such as Moynihan and Wallop. Gary Hart was hostile, but Percy
was open to dialogue with Team B.