Christopher Mayhew of British intelligence with the approval of PM Clement Attlee. Forum World
Features was part of the network that got into the act during the destabilization of Harold Wilson forthe benefit of Margaret Thatcher. [fn 26]
This Prescott Bush-William Casey think tank promoted the creation of endowed chairs in strategic
analysis, national intelligence, and the like on a number of campuses. The Georgetown Center for
Strategic and International Studies, later the home of Kissinger, Ledeen, and a whole stable ofideologues of Anglo-American empire, was in part a result of the work of Casey and Prescott.
Casey was also an old friend of Leo Cherne. When Cherne was appointed to PFIAB in the summer
of 1973, Casey, who was at that time Nixon's Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, sent
Cherne a warm note of congratulations telling how "delighted" he had been to get the official noticeof Cherne's new post. [fn 27]
Casey was also a close associate of George Bush. During 1976, Ford appointed Casey to PFIAB,
where Casey was an enthusiastic supporter of the Team B operation along with Bush and Cherne.
George Bush and Casey would play decisive roles in the secret government operations of theReagan years.
As the Republican convention gathered in Detroit in July, 1980, the problem was to convince
Reagan of the inevitability of tapping Bush as his running mate. But Reagan did not want Bush. He
had conceived an antipathy, even a hostility for George. One factor may have been British liberalPeter Teeley's line about Reagan's "voodoo economics." But the decisive factor was what Reagan (^)
had experienced personally from Bush during the Nashua Telegraph debate, which had left a lasting
and highly derogatory impression.
According to one account of this phase, "ever since the episode in Nashua in February, Reagan hadcome to hold the preppy Yankee transplant in, as the late Senator Robert Kerr of Oklahoma used to (^)
say, mimumum high regard. 'Reagan is a very gracious contestant,' one of his inner circle said, 'and
he generally views his opponents with a good deal of respect. The thing he couldn't understand was
Bush's conduct at the Nashua Telegraph debate. It imprinted with Reagan that Bush was a wimp.
He remembered that night clearly when we had our viunderstand how a man could have sat there so passively. He felt it showed a lack of courage." Andce-presidential discussions. He couldn't (^)
now that it was time to think about a running mate, the prospective presidential nominee gave a
sympathetic ear to those who objected to Bush for reasons that ran, one of the group said later, from
his behavior at Nashua to 'anit-Trilateralism'" According to this account, conservatives seeking to
stop Bush at the convention were citing their suspicions about a "'conspiracy' backed by Rocto gain control of the American government." [fn 28] kefeller
Drew Lewis was a leading Bushman submarine in the Reagan camp, telling the candidate that Bush
could help him in electoral college megastates like Pennsylvania and Michigan where Ted Kennedy
had demonstrated that Carter was vulnerable during the primaries. Lewis badgered Reagan with theprospect that if he waited too long, he would have to accept a politically neutral running mate in the (^)
way that Ford took Dole in 1976, which might end up costing him the election. According to Lewis,
Reagan needed to broaden his base, and Bush was the most palatable and practical vehicle for doing
so.
Much to his credit, Reagan resisted; "he told several staff members and advisers that he still
harbored 'doubts' about Bush, based on Nashua. "If he can't stand up to that kind of pressure,'
Reagan told one intimate, 'how could he stand up to the pressure of being president?' To another, he
said: "I want to be very frank with you. I have strong reservations about George Bush. I'm
concerned about turning the country over to him.'"