present government of Iran has declined to confirm, or deny this contact, saying that "the Islamic
Government of Iran sees no benefit to involve itself in the matter."
Casey's whereabouts are officially unknown between July 26-27 and July 30. What is known is that
as soon as Casey surfaced again in Washington on July 30, he reported back to vice presidential
candidate George Bush in a dinner meeting held at the Alibi Club. It is certain from the evidence
that there were negotiations with the Mullahs by the Reagan-Bush camp, and that Bush was heavilyinvolved at every stage.
In early September, Bush's brother Prescott Bush became involved with a letter to James Baker in
which he described his contacts with a certain Herbert Cohen, a consultant to the Carter
Administration on M"politicize" the hostage issue by openly denouncing any machinations that Carter might attempt.iddle East matters. Cohen had promised to abort any possible Carter moves to
Prescott offered Baker a meeting with Cohen. Were it not fot the power of the Brown Brothers,
Harriman/Skull and Bones networks, George's brother Prescott Bush might have become something
likt the Billy Carter of the 1980's.
In September-October 1980 there was a meeting at the L'Enfant Plaza Hotel in Washington among
Richard Allen, Bud McFarlane, Laurence Silberman of the Reagan-Bush campaign and a
mysterious Iranian representative, thought to be an emissary of Iranian asset Hashemi Rafsanjani,
an asset of US intelligence who was becoming one of the most powerful mullahs in Khomeini's
entourage. The Iranian representative offered a deal whereby "he could get the hostages releaseddirectly to our campaign before the election," Silberman recalls. Allen has claimed that he cut this (^)
meeting short after twenty minutes. Allen, McFarlane, and Silberman (later named a federal judge)
all failed to report this approach to the White House, the State Department, or other authorities.
On September 22, Irawhich would claim more than a million lives. The US intelligence estimate had been that Khomeiniq invaded Iran, starting a war that would last until the middle of 1988 and (^)
and the mullahs were in danger of losing power by the end of 1980 because of their incompetence,
corruption, and benighted stupidity. US and other western intelligence agencies, especially the
French, thereupon encouraged Iraq to attack Iran, offering the prospect of an easy victory. The easy
victory" analysis was incorporated into a "secret" CIA report which was delivered to the SaudiArabian government with the suggestion that it be leaked to Iraq. The real US estimate was that a (^)
war with Iraq would strengthen Khomeini against reformers who looked to President Bani-Sadr,
and that the war emergency would assist in the imposition of a "new dark ages" regime in Iran. An
added benefit was that Iran and Iraq as warring states would be forced vastly to increase their oil
production, forcdollar with an important subsidy in terms of the dollar's ability to command basic commodities ining down the oil price on the world market and thus providing the bankrupt US (^)
the real world. Bani-Sadr spoke in this connection of "an oil crisis in reverse" as a result of the Iran-
Iraq war.
President Bani-Sadr, who was later deposed in a coup d'etat by Khomeini, Rafsanjani, and Beheshti,has recalled that during this period Khomeini decided to bet on Reagan-Bush. "So what if Reagan
wins," said Khomeini. "Nothing will really change since he and Carter are both enemies of Islam."
[fn 39]
This was the time of the Reagan-Carter presidential debates, and Casey's operation had also yieldedbooty in this regard. Bush ally and then Congressman David Stockman boasted in Indiana in late
October that he had used a "pilfered copy" of Carter's personal briefing book to coach Reagan prior
to a debate.
Many sources agree that a conclusive series of meetings between Reagan-Bush and the Khomeini