animated fashion about the problems encountered by the contras. "North was particularly concerned
with allegations that had surfaced connecting the contras with narcotics trafficking." One US publicfigure who had called attention to the contras as drug pushers was Lyndon LaRouche. "North urged
Noriega to do whatever he could for the contras. During this meeting North claimed that he was in
charge of all operations in central America having to do with the contras and that he was working
directly for Reagan and Bush. Although North asked for help he did not say exactly what he
wanted. North did tell Noriega that if at any time he needed to talk to North that Noriega could justcall him at the White House." [fn 33]
According to Noriega's CIPA proffer submitted in preparation for his trial in Miami, "from around
August of 1985 through September of 86 Noriega repeatedly received emissaries from Oliver
North. One was Humberto Quinones. Quinones attempted to ingratiate himself with Noriega andrepeatedly used Reagan's and Bush's names. Quinones said that the contras are not fighting very
well and requested that Panama come to the aid of the contras."
Later, at the end of the summer of 1985, Noriega met with North and Secord in London. North
demanded that Noriega use Panamanian commandos to conduct operations against the Sandinistaregime. "Noriega just listened" and did not agree to cooperate. [fn 34]
This was all denied by the Bush campaign through spokesman Steve Hart, but a photo exists of
Bush meeting with Noriega in Panama City in December, 1983. Don Gregg was also on the scene.
This meeting was also attended by Everett Briggs, then the US Ambassador to Panama. During theprevious months, Noriega had repudiated the policy of supporting the Nicaraguan contra rebels
which the Bushmen had successfully sold to Reagan as his leading obsession. Noriega had done this
by declaring his support fo the Contadora group, which thus emerged as an alignment of Mexico,
Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama, and which advocated a plan for pacification and the restoration
of national sovereignty in Central America as a whole through tthe removal of foreign advisers and bases. According to Briggs, Bush may have sought Noriega'she interdiction of gun-running, plus
diplomatic support for the US position in the region. But Briggs denies that Bush was also looking
for Panamanian military support against the Sandinistas. According to the Bushmen, Bush's
pourparler in Panama was devoted to a "privileged" talk with the President of Panama, Ricardo de
la Espriella, who was also present at the meeting. [fn 35] Butfigure on the Panamanian political scene. Noriega was clearly the dominant
Later, Bush henchman Don Gregg was obliged to testify under oath about Bush's relations with
Noriega in the context of the civil lawsuit brought by the Christic Institute of Washington, DC
against members of the Bush-Shackley-Clines Enterprise. Gregg specified that Ambassador Briggswas himself a friend of Bush. Gregg said that at the December, 1983 meeting, Panamanian
President Ricardo de la Espriella had denied US press reports alleging Panamanian government
complicity in drug trafficking.
But while Noriega kept close relations with the United States, he also dealt with Cuba and othercountries in the region. Noriega was increasingly motivated by Panamanian nationalism, and a
desire to preserve a margin of independence for his country. The hostility of the US government
against Noriega was occasioned first of all by Noriega's refusal to be subservient to the US policy of
waging war against the Sandinista regime. This was explained by Noriega in an interview with CBS
journalist Mike Wallace on February 4, 1988, ihim as a "political conspiracy of the Department of Justice." Noriega described a visit to Panama onn which Noriega described the US campaign against (^)
December 17, 1985 by Admiral John Poindexter, then the chief of the US National Security
Council, who demanded that Noriega join in acts of war against Nicaragua, and then threatened
Panama with economic warfare and political destabilization when Noriega refused to go along with
Poindexter's plans: