These were the impusles and perspectives which impinged on BusMother Country," and which were vigorously imparted to him in his frequent consultations withh from what he later called "the
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who now loomed very large in the configuration of
Bush's personal network.
Bush had met Gorbachov in March, 1985, wfuneral of old Konstantin Chernenko, the octogenarian symbol of the impasse of the post-Andropovhen his "you die, we fly" services were required for the (^)
Kremlin who had ruled the USSR for just 390 days. Gorbachov had come highly recommended by
Margaret Thatcher, with whom he had become acquainted the previous year. Thatcher had judged
the new-look Gorbachov a man with whom she could do business. Bush came to Moscow bearing
an invitation frompirouette of Geneva that November. Bush gave Gorbachov a garbled and oblique endorsement: "If Reagan for a parley at the summit; this would later become the choreographed (^)
ever there was a time that we can move forward with progress in the last few years, then I would
say this is a good time for that," stammered Bush. [fn 3] After Geneva there would follow summits
in Iceland in 1986, Washington in 1987 to sign the INF treaty, and then Reagan's swan song in
Moscow in the summer of 1988, ahave seen, the Bush team was contemptuous of slobbering sentimental old Reagan, a soft touch who valuable auxiliary to George's own electioneering. But, as we (^)
let the Russians take him to the cleaners, especially in arms control negotiations. Bush wanted to
drive a hard bargain, and that meant stalling until the Soviets became truly desperate for any deal.
In addition, when Reagan and Bush had met Gorbachov on Governor's Island in New York harbor
in the midst of the transition, Gorbachov had been guilty of lese majeste towards the heir apparentand had piqued Bush's ire.
According to one account of the Governor's Island meeting of December 7, 1988, after some small
talk by Uncle Ron, Bush wanted to know from Gorbachov, "What assurance can you give me that I
can pass to American businessmen who want to invest in the Soviet Union that perestroika andglasnost will succeed?" Was this the official business of the United States, or investment
counselling for Kravis, Liedkte, Mossbacher, and Pickens? Gorbachov's reply is recalled by
participants as brusque to the point of rudeness: "Not even Jesus Christ knows the answer to that
question," said he, amidst the gasps of Bush's staff. A minute later, Gorbachov turned to Bush with
a lecture: "Let me take this opportunity to tell you something. Your staff may have told you thatwhat I'm doing is all a trick. It's not. I'm playing real politics. I have a revolution going that I
announced in 1986. Now, in 1988, the Soviet people don't like it. Don't misread me, Mr. Vice
President, I have to play real politics." [fn 4] After that, the telegenic Gorbachov could look for his
photo opportunities somewhere else during most of 1989. There would ne no early Most Favored
Nation trade status for Moscow. In addition, the signals from London wwas Bush's "prudent review" of US-Soviet relations. ere to go slow. The result
Gorbachov was always hungry for summitry, and during an April visit to Thatcher, the Soviet
leader chided Bush for the US "hesitation" on new arms control deals. Bush dismissed this remark
with a huff: "We're making a prudent review, and I will be ready to discuss that with the Sovietswhen we are ready. We'll be ready to react when we feel like reacting." [fn 5] Ministerial meeting (^)
between Baker and Shevardnadze were proceeding. In May, the voice of Reagan was heard from
his California retirement, telling his friends that he was "increasingly concerned at what he
considers an excessively cautious approach to nuclear arms reductions with the Soviets." Reagan
thought that Bush was indeed too hesitant, and that Gorbachov was seizing the initiative withwestern Europe as a result. In the view attributed to Reagan by these unnamed friends, "Bush opted (^)
for the delaying tactic of a policy review, behaving the way new presidents do when replacing
someone from the opposing party with different views." According to journalist Lou Cannon, "both
in Bonn and in Beverly Hills they are wondering if Bush's only strategy is to react to events as they
unfold." [fn 6] There was the wimp again.