one version, Gen. Schwarzkopf estimated that it would take 17 weeks to move a defensive,
deterrent force of 250,000 tground force capable of driving the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. For the duration of the crisis, theroops into the region, and between 8 and 12 months to assemble a (^)
Army would remain the most reluctant, while the Air Force, including Scowcroft, would be the
most eager to open hostilities. Bush sensed that he had to stress the defense of Saudi Arabia to keep
all of his bureaucratic players on board, and to garner enough public support to carry out the first
phase of the buildup. Then, perhaps three months down the line, preferably after the Novemberelections, he could unveil the full offensive buildup that would carry him into war with Iraq. "That's (^)
why our defense of Saudi Arabia has to be our focus," Bush is reported to have said at this meeting.
This remark was calculated to cater to the views of Gen. Powell, who was thinking primarily in
these defensive terms. [fn 38] When the larger NSC meeting dispersed, Bush met with a more
restricted group isession was dominated by the fear that the Saudi Arabian monarchy, which would have to bencluding Quayle, Sununu, Baker, Scowcroft, Cheney, Powell, and Webster. This
coerced into agreeement with plans for a US military buildup on its territory, would prefer a
compromise solution negotiated among the Arabs to the Anglo-Saxon war hysteria. The Saudis
were not all as staunch as the American agent Prince Bandar; the presence of large contingents of
infidel ground tto pose an insoluble political problem. There was great racist vituperation of the Arabs in general:roops, including Jews and women, would create such friction with Saudi society as
they could not be trusted, they were easy to blackmail. This meeting produced a decision that Bush
would call Saudi King Fahd and demand that he accept a large US ground force contingent in
addition to aircraft.
As Bush feared, Fahd was inclined to reject the US ground forces. There was a report that Iraq had
announced that its forces would leave Kuwait on Sunday, and Fahd wanted to see if that happened.
Fahd had not yet been won over to the doctrine of war at any cost. Through an intrigue of Prince
Bandar, who knew that this difficulty might arise, King Fahd was prevailed upon to receive a US
"briefing team" to illustrate the threat to him and demand that he approve the US buildup on hiterritory. Fahd thought that all he was getting were a few briefing officers. But Bush saw this as as (^)
wedge for greater things. "I want to do this. I want to do it big time," Bush told Scowcroft. [fn 39]
By now Bush had launched into his "speed-dialing" mode, calling heads of state and government
one after the other, organizing for an economic embargo and a military confrontation with Iraq. One
important call was to Sheikh Jabir al Ahmed al Sabah, the degenerate Emir of Kuwait,representative of a family who had been British assets since 1899 and Bush's business partners since (^)
the days of Zapata Offshore in the late 1950's. Other calls went to Turgut Oezal of Turkey, whom
Bush pressed to cut off Iraq's use of oil pipelines across his territory. Another call went to Canadian
Prime Minister Mulroney, who was also in deep domestic political trouble, and who was inclined to
join the Anglo-Saxon mobilization. During the course of Saturday, White House officials began tospread a deception story that Bush had been "surprised by the invasion this week and largely
unprepared to respond quickly," as the next day's New York Times alleged.
At 8 AM on Sunday morning, there was another meeting of the NSC at Camp David with Bush,
Baker, Cheney, Scowcroft, Powell and various aides. This time the talk was almost exclusivelydevoted to military options. Bush designated Cheney for the Saudi mission, and Cheney left
Washington for Saudi Arabia in the middle of Sunday afternoon.
Bush now boarded a helicopter for the flight from Camp David back to the White House south
lawn. Up to this point, Bush was firmly committed to war in his own mind, and had been acting onthat decision in his secret councils of regime, but he had carefully avoided making that decision
clear in public. We are now approaching the moment when he would do so. Let us contemplate
George Bush's state of mind as he rode in his helicopter from Camp David towards Washington on
that early August Sunday afternoon. According to one published account, Bush was "in a mood that
White House officials describe variously as mad, testy, peevish, and, to use a favorite bit of Bush-