Bush was now conducting a systematic "mind war" campaign to coerce the American people into
accepting the war he had already chosen. On August 20, Busnow calling the American citizens detained in Iraq "hostages." Under international law, theh introduced a new rhetorical note,
imminent threat of acts of war against a country entitles that country to intern enemy aliens as a
matter of self-defense; this had been the rule in earlier wars. Henceforth, Bush would attempt to
turn the hostage issue on and off according to his propaganda needs, until Iraq freed all the
Americans in early December.
On August 27, Bush opined that "Saddam Hussein has been so resistant to complying with
international law that I don't yet see fruitful negotiations." [fn 48] Statements like these were made
to cloak the fact that Bush was adamantly refusing to negotiate with Iraq, and preventing other
nations from doing so. Bush's diplomatic posture was in effect an ultimatum to Iraq to get out ofKuwait, with the Iraqi departure to come before any discussions. Bush called this a refusal to
reward aggression; it was in fact a refusal to negotiate in good faith, and made clear that Bush
wanted war. His problem was that the US military buildup was taking longer than expected, with
ship convoys forced to turn back in the Atlantic because freighters broke down and were left dead
in the water. Bush strove to fill the time with new demagogic propaganda gambits.
Bush returned to Washington at the end of August to address members of Congress. In the public
part of this meeting, Bush reiterated that his goal was to "persuade Iraq to withdraw." There
followed an executive session behind closed doors. The next day Bush recorded a broadcast to the
US forces in the Gulf, which was beamed to Saudi Arabia by the Armed Forces Radio. "Soldiers ofpeace will always be more than a match for a tyrant bent on aggression," Bush told the troops.
During early September, it became evident that that the US and Soviet approaches to the Gulf crisis
were beginning to show some signs of divergence. Up to this point, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
had backed every step made by Bush and Baker, but the US Gulf intervention was not popular
among Red Army commanders and among Soviet Moslems who were disturbed by the infideloccupation of the holy places. On September 9, Bush met with Gorbachov in Helsinki, Finnland in (^)
order to discuss this and other matters of interest to a condominium in which the Anglo-Saxons
were now more than ever the senior partners. Gorbachov spoke up for "a political solution" to the
conflict, but his government willingly took part in every vote of the UN Security Council which
opened the way to the Gulf war. A few days later, on September 15, Busfrom his masonic brother Francois Mitterrand, who exploited a trifling incident involving Frenchh received precious support
diplomatic premises in Kuwait -- the sort of thing that Bush had done repeatedly in Panama --
massively to escalate the French troop presence and rhetoric in the Gulf. "C'est une aggression, et
nous allons y repondre," said the master of the Grand Orient; the spirit of Suez 1956, the spirit of
the Algerian war and of Dienbienphu were alive and well in France.
To while away the weeks of the buildup, Bush busied himself with extortion. This was directed
especially against Germany and Japan, two countries that were targets of the Gulf war, and whom
Bush now called upon to pay for it. The constitutions of these countries prevented them from
sending military contingents, and intervention would have been unpopulopinion in any case. Japan was assessed $4 billion in tribute, and Germany a similar sum. By thear with domestic public (^)
end of the crisis, Bush and Baker had organized a $55 billion shakedown at the expense of a series
of countries. These combined to produce the first balance of payments surplus for the United States
in recent memory during the first quarter of 1991, obtaining a surcease for the dollar.
But even prediscounting this extorted tribute, the fiscal crisis of the US Treasury was becoming
overwhelming. On September 11, Bush was to address the Congress on the need for austerity
measures to reduce the deficit for the coming fiscal year. But Bush did not wish to appear before the
Congress as a simple bankrupt; he wanted to strut before them as a warrior. The resulting speech
was a curious hybrid, first addressing the Gulf crisis, and only then turning to the dolorous balance