The Nature of Political Theory

100 The Nature of Political Theory

political theory throughout the second half of the twentieth century. It also ties in
closely into doctrines of epistemological pluralism and particularism, moral plural-
ism and fortuitously a Millian form of liberalism, or what John Gray calls, ‘the chronic
character of normative and epistemic dissensus’ (see Gallie 1955–6; Gray 1977: 335–
6; Flathman 1989: 4). It also supports, as Gray puts it, ‘a conception of political
philosophy’ (Gray 1977: 345). In fact, Gray takes the noteworthy step of identifying
essential contestability as a ‘definite metaphysical’ position, in addition to being com-
mitted to a pluralist liberal vision (Gray 1978: 395). Interestingly, the metaphysical
dimensions of this vision do not often get a mention; this would be largely due to the
more general allergic reaction to metaphysics during the twentieth century.

A Reckoning with Essential Contestability

Despite the fact that Wittgenstein and the essential contestability thesis have had a
powerful role in underpinning the general pedagogical approach to political theory,
there have also been a series of challenges and attempts at modification, some more
successful than others. The legacy of Wittgenstein has moved in different directions.
Orthodox earnest philosophical scholarship on the ‘master’ has gone on regardless—
this philosophical hagiography (which unfortunately always happens to interesting
thinkers), will no doubt keep publishers busy well into the future. The present account
considers four reactions to Wittgenstein and the essential contestability thesis, some
of these will be taken up again later in the book, since they are still very much part
of contemporary discussion of difference theory and postmodernism. Many of the
criticisms revolve around positive and negative reactions to the same elements of the
essential contestability (basically Wittgensteinian) arguments. There is clearly a great
adaptability in the Wittgensteinian argument.^13
One of the core areas of debate over the essential contestability argument relates to
the potentially deep—what some would regard as disabling—relativism and incom-
mensurability of the argument. Thepositiveview of this can be identified loosely
with two responses. The first can be called the deconstructive reception, both to
this argument and to Wittgenstein’s later thought. In this reading, the essential
contestability argument does not push far enough. The second response focuses
on Gallie’s potential historicism and emphasizes that essential contestability should
move progressively and naturally into more conceptually-orientated history (Begriffs-
geschichte). Thenegativeresponse also has two faces. The first reacts critically to the
collapse of agreed definitions of concepts, and demands a reconstruction of con-
cepts to make them clearly operational within political debate. The second negative
response focuses, again, on the disabling relativism, but wends around this by drawing
a distinction between a strong and weak essential contestability theses.^14
The first positive response can almost be observed evolving over the various editions
of William Connolly’sThe Terms of Political Discourse, since its publication in 1974,
as he moves from the more conventional late Wittgensteinian position, via Fou-
cault, into a genealogical position. This is by no means an unusual process. There