Foundations Shaken but Not Stirred 105end of the century. The key dilemma for such texts—which have usually standardly
been ahistorical alphabetic lists of ‘key’ concepts—is whether concepts should either
be subjected to a neutral phenomenological description or a critical tidying up. This
is the old difference between logical positivism and ordinary language theory. Most
texts incorporate a confused blend of both. David Raphael, for example, in a popular
textbook,The Problems of Political Philosophy, used to introduce many generations
of students to political theory, commented that the discipline was, unsurprisingly,
focused on clarifying concepts. This involved three elements: analysis of the concept
(which specifies its basic elements), synthesis (which shows the logical relationships
between concepts), and finally, improvement of the concept. The first two were
standard ordinary language fare. The latter entailed ‘recommending a definition or
use that will assist clarity or coherence’ (Raphael 1976: 13). It also involved a select-
ive and dismissive attitude to what previously went under the rubric of theory. As
Raphael commented, for example, ‘The history of political philosophy since the six-
teenth century contains a great deal of tedious-looking discussion...Much of it is
indeed tedious’ (Raphael 1976: 15–16). Here we experience again the Weldonian and
logical positivist hubris.
Raphael was aware that many ordinary language thinkers believed that we should
reject any normative improvement for political philosophy. He commented that ‘A
philosopher may think that his task is simply to chart the old and new meanings,
but it seems to me that the process of clarification must often inevitably carry with
it a sharpening and so a slight change of the meaning of the concept’ (Raphael 1976:
14). However, for Raphael, the ahistorical analysis of concepts does have a benefi-
cial dimension. He comments that ‘The clarification of concepts is like cleaning the
house. When you have cleaned the house, there is not much to be seen from your
work. You have not acquired any new possessions, though you will have thrown out
some things that are not wanted and are just a nuisance. What you have at the end
of it is a tidier house, in which you can move around more easily’ (Raphael 1976:
16). This is not a once and for all job and it needs to be done regularly by each
generation. The rubbish clearance, or conceptual cleanliness, view of political theory
is again reminiscent of Weldon et al., where removal of ‘mental lumber’ is seen as
central. Raphael’s hesitant argument that concepts can be sharpened or improved
is stillnota contention that political theory constructs or offers any definite norm-
ative answers. Political theory isnotabout normative argument, it is about clear
thought—a form of continuous intellectual hand-washing—on the important con-
cepts constituting the issue orthodoxy. This encourages the belief that the theorist
is still engaged in an academically reputable, universally important, and yet socially
accountable activity.
Notes
- In many ways much of the discussion of logical positivism and early linguistic philosophy
could have fitted in Part One with ease. There would have been some sense to have had an