118 The Nature of Political Theoryneeded for, then the need becomes unintelligible. Thus, a car needs petrol to move
and function. However, once one says what it is needed for (a Z), then Z becomes a
mode of justification, which needs to be assessed. Thus, needs are not self-sufficient
for generating obligations. Needs are conversely relative to end-states—certain Zs.
Thus, need moves from the empirical to the normative sphere, which, of course,
undermines the initial thrust of the empirical argument. These, and other criticisms,
have undermined some of the force of the needs-based distributive argument.
Justice and Mutual Advantage
The second dimension of the anti-desert position is the rationalist position. As indic-
ated, there are two forms of this contractarian argument that have dominated the
literature. These are justice as mutual advantage and justice as impartiality. Both
repudiate each other’s views on justice.
David Gauthier’s work is a typical formulation of justice as mutual advantage,
which is, as mentioned, also a sophisticated form of rational choice argument. The
central aim of Gauthier’sMorals by Agreement(1986) is to derive principles of mor-
ality and justice from the non-moral, more empirically orientated, premise of the
rational self-interested agent. The above book can thus be read as an attempt to
defend Western liberal market society by ‘representing its ideal nature in relation to
reason’ (Gauthier 1986: 353), although it is a very particular empirical, economic,
and highly instrumental view of reason. It is not reason in itself. Subjective interests
and preferences are regarded as primary. Conventions, which do exist, are the out-
come of bargaining process between individuals trying to maximize their interests.
There is a strong—if deeply suspect—assumption here of relatively equal bargaining
powers between all individuals. Gauthier thus sees his account of justice as mid-way
‘between the simple individualism of Robert Nozick and the implicit collectivism of
John Rawls’ (Gauthier 1986: 268).
The assumptions behind his work are focused on isolated rational individuals,
each embodying a capacity for practical reason. Gauthier openly admits that his
work,Moral by Agreement, is underpinned by a foundational metaphysics of the
self. This is essentially a form of methodological and moral individualism (Gauthier
1988: 220–1).^14 It is an account premised largely upon neo-classical economic theory.
Each person thus seeks the maximum satisfaction of their interests. This maximizing
strategy ‘lies at the core of economic theory, and is generalized in decision theory and
game theory’. (Gauthier 1986: 8). As Gauthier comments on rationality, ‘We order
our desires, in relation to decision and action, so that we may choose to maximize our
expectation of desire-fulfilment. And in so doing, we show ourselves to be rational
agents. I shall not question this maximizing view...agreeing with economists and
others that there is simply nothing else for practical rationality to be’ (Gauthier 1988:
174). Morality and rationality are thus all relative to ‘economic man’, who, according
to Gauthier, is ‘the natural man of our time’. Each person is viewed as ‘a Robinson
Crusoe’ in the market society (Gauthier 1986: 91). Markets and morals share the same