An Eclectic Subject 3be a subject for theory to investigate and reflect on. In other words, this book is an
appeal to a more thorough critical reflection on the nature of political theory itself.
Foundations
In trying to give some shape to political theory in the twentieth century, a formal
theme has to be adopted to make the narrative comprehensible. The conceptual
theme focused on here is relatively straightforward—namely, the concept of a founda-
tion. The term ‘foundation’ is used in a very broad sense. It is taken to imply some
class of statements or propositions, which are favoured absolutely over others. To
be foundational, this class of statements is regarded as ‘fundamental’—‘fundamental’
implying that its possessors cannot avoid deferring or referring back to it. This class of
statements is, in other words, always presupposed by a diversity of other statements.
Insofar as this class of statements is fundamental, it can be considered near inescapable
or near unavoidable in any theorizing. Foundational statements also allow inferences
and systematic deductions to be made, which explain and account for a range of
other statements. Foundational statements, therefore, have an encompassing capacity.
They ensure the overall ‘coherence’ of a range of other statements. This coherent set
of interlinked statements constitutes a theory. My use of the term ‘foundation’ has
close parallels with other terms such as ‘metaphysics’, ‘first principles’, or ‘absolute
presuppositions’.
Foundations—particularly in the sense of metaphysical foundations—have been
central to the Western tradition. Rather than move into a detailed account of the
origin of metaphysical or foundationalist analysis, three uses of foundationalism in
twentieth century political theory are indicated. This is purely an indicative list and
there may be considerable overlap between these ‘ideal types’. The first use implies
a rich, substantive, or comprehensive foundation; the second is a thinned down,
translucent, or bleached foundation; the third focuses more closely on the logic of
presuppositions. I call these the comprehensive, immanent, and logical senses of
foundation.
The richer foundation implies a comprehensive, perfectionist, and transcendental
theory, which entails some form of objective standard of moral judgement. In terms
of twentieth-century political theory, this conception is most characteristic of the
impact of philosophical idealism on political theory in Britain, Europe, and North
America (see Boucher and Vincent 2001). ‘Comprehensive’ implies that a founda-
tional conception is identifiable in terms of its ability to explain—its encompassing
power. It is therefore the reach of the explanation that is crucial. The term ‘founda-
tional’ here is virtually synonymous with classical understandings of metaphysics.
The attempt to examine reality as a whole can be seen, for example, in Spinoza’s
monism, Leibniz’s monadology, or Hegel’s absolute idealism. The perfectionist ele-
ment imports a ‘value’ into the total view. This is where foundations can become
virtually-religious principles. Metaphysical foundations can thus be perceived as the
highest and most perfect form of human knowledge—accounting for God, freedom,