Bleached Foundations 131is clear that spheres should not intermix or try to dominate other spheres. He draws
a parallel distinction between simple and complex equality. Simple equality is where
there is one dominant good which all spheres should acclimatize to. Complex equality
implies a multiplicity or plurality of goods in different spheres. Yet, to maintain this
pluralism requires that the barriers between spheres are patrolled, in order to prevent
conversions between distinct goods.^22 These spheres underpin Walzer’s account of
justice.
The core idea is relatively simple. Basically different social goods should be dis-
tributed, for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different
agents. Each social good therefore prescribes its own norms of distribution. No per-
son or good should be dominant in all spheres. Ironically, both Rawls and Barry, in
one sense, are after something similar, but they want to abstract from the diverse par-
ticulars to find theirmodus operandi, whereas Walzer wants to enterintothe diverse
particulars. Walzer is seeking a society free of domination and committed to complex
egalitarianism, not unlike forms of pluralistic guild socialism or syndicalism earlier in
the twentieth century. This implies, for Walzer, that there can be no one overarching
universal account of justice. The main spheres in contemporary liberal societies are
security and welfare, money and commodities, office (employment), work, free time,
education, kinship and love, divine grace, recognition (public honours), and polit-
ical power.^23 Walzer thinks these all have analogues in most societies. Each sphere
should have relative autonomy in the criteria and manner of its distribution. Justice is
therefore plural and differentiated. The meaning of the good and its criterion of just
distribution are also often tightly interlocked. The criterion for the distribution of
public honours is not therefore the same as that for medical care. Attaining an hon-
oured status does not mean you gain the same status in, say, medical care. One cannot
cross spheres. Money, for example, cannot be converted into religious or educational
advantage. Walzer seems particularly concerned that money should not be a domin-
ant good, namely one that tyrannizes over other goods. However, writing this book
in prosperous, but deeply unequal, North America, Walzer appears peculiarly out
of touch and distant from his own society (let alone other societies), namely, where
money continuously crosses spheres and buys all manner of privileges and honours
as a matter of basic social convention. The North American university system is a
living testament to monied privilege in education. However, distributive justice, for
Walzer, is still seen to be open-ended, in terms of what is distributed and the manner
in which it is distributed.^24
Thus, in sum, within the rationalist contractarian position there are two distinct
stresses on justice. For Rawls and Barry, the function of justice is to supply a reasonable
basis for agreement, for taking account of diverse or plural interests and conceptions
of the good. In Gauthier, justice is seen as the outcome of a bargaining process
among individuals, showing why individuals, reasoning from non-moral premises,
can still nonetheless accept the constraint of morality. Voluntary self-constraint is
central. To pursue personal advantage, rational individuals need to cooperate. Thus,
Gauthier claims to show the devices which enable egoists to get along. Both the above
‘rationalist’ accounts of justice are constructivist and contractualist. Neither are reliant