Bleached Foundations 133tested in a theoretical construction. The task of political philosophy, for neo-Kantian
rationalism, is consequently to ‘examine whether some underlying basis of agreement
can be uncovered and a mutually acceptable way of resolving these questions publicly
established’ (Rawls in Strong (ed.) 1992: 97).
For justice proponents, the deep normative resources provided by the idea of
‘reasonableness’ cannot be undermined by showing that cultures or communities
have different traditions or customs.^26 In other words, it is possible to engage in
rigorous analysis of the internal diversity of concepts, such as justice, but once the
core intuitions and elements have been fully grasped, and the theory has carefully
abstracted and synthesized these intuitions into clear rules, then the concepts can
begin to take on an essential shape. The theorist can then make careful inferences
and justify a reading of justice which will have public policy implications. In the
most general terms, political philosophy, therefore, examines rigorously the basic
principles that underpin or regulate reasonable cooperation. Justice is premised upon
widely shared values, which can be tested in a theoretical construction. This embodies
the underlying logic of desert-based, rationalist contractarian (i.e. both justice as
impartiality and justice as mutual advantage), and the various proceduralist accounts
of justice. It does not, however, encompass the needs-based argument, which claims
to rest on empirical rather than normative foundations.
Justice-based theory still upholds, indirectly, what was referred to in Chapter
Three, as the ‘issue orthodoxy’ approach. Within this approach, the major task
of the political theorist is still seen as the analysis of a finite range of concepts,
which are taken to ‘sum up’ politics. The difference in the justice arguments (and
much recent justificatory-based arguments) is that a core component has been
identified, which allows the theorist to move confidently beyond the realm of lin-
guistic phenomenology into the broad justification of a particular conceptual issue
(such as justice), and ultimately, into the policy sphere. Furthermore, like ordin-
ary language and essential contestability, the justificatory normative approach is
stalwartly ahistorical. This ahistorical stance is not so much a self-conscious philo-
sophical position or intended policy, as a default reaction to an annoying irrelevance.
Normative theory, qua justice, thus remains firmly and inflexibly synchronic in
character.
A similar mode of argument characterizes the relationship of justice theory with
the more diachronic ideological understanding of politics. Political philosophy, trying
to maintain its professionalism, universal patina, and moral gravitas, usually denies
its relation with the grubby world of ideology. This again is never really argued,
rather, just asserted. The oddity of this point is that the dominant branches of justice
discussion (particularly the contractarian arguments) have all been resolutely ideo-
logically liberal in character. In the case of proceduralists (such as Hayek), justice
as mutual advantage theorists (such as Buchanan and Gauthier), and impartiality
theorists (such as Rawls, Scanlon, or Barry), and even justice as a plural mix (such as
Walzer and Miller);allhave been keen to express their political (one might hesitate
to say ideological) credentials and the majority are stalwartly liberal. All have stressed
the practical policy implications of their work.