Shoring Up Foundations 155In this sense, communitarianism lays down a loose template for considering other
recent expressions of conventionalist argument. In this context, the discussion of
communitarianism will be fairly condensed, since it will appear in tandem with other
conventionalist claims.^13
There are several initial ambiguities, which need reviewing on the term
‘communitarianism’. First, it is not altogether clear which theorists are being
addressed under the rubric of communitarianism.Prima facie, the answer does seem
obvious: the standard account is that a movement, commonly called communit-
arian and focused primarily on the writings of a number of political philosophers,
blossomed during the 1980s, partly as a reaction to thin proceduralist versions
of liberalism and justice. The political philosophers most closely associated with
this movement are Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, and Alisdair
MacIntyre. Thus, when communitarian theories are mentioned, in any political the-
ory context, it is usually the latter theorists that are in the spotlight. Despite the
fact that this is very widely accepted in the literature, the strangeness of this point
is thatnoneof the above thinkers accept the term to describe or summarize their
work. In fact some, such as MacIntyre, go out of their way to reject it.^14 Amitai
Etzioni, a principal figure in the current communitarian movement in North Amer-
ica, consequently accepts MacIntyre’s rejection of communitarianism and describes
his work as an articulation of a sophisticated moderate social conservatism (Etzioni
1997: 15). In fact, Etzioni continues, that all the above political thinkers have ‘been
uncomfortable with the label “communitarian” ’ (Etzioni 1997: 40). Taylor also, partly
because of his quite evident disquiet with nationalism, and also, partly because of his
interest in a more multicultural position (in the Canadian context), has also raised
profound doubts about the term ‘communitarian’. It seems to indicate, for Taylor,
too much of a consensual idea of community and does not take enough account
of ‘deep diversity’ (see Taylor in Tully (ed.) 1994: 250 and 256).^15 Further, Sandel,
quite simply, does not refer to it at all in his last book, Democracy’s Discontents
(1996). He seems much happier with the denotation republican. The only one of
the four theorists to actually give the term ‘communitarianism’ some intellectual
space is Walzer. He notes that he is moderately happy to see his work described as—
what he calls—a ‘periodic communitarian correction’ to some mainstream work in
political theory (see Walzer 1990). One could hardly though call this a full-blooded
commitment.
Thus, in considering the extensive political theory debates over communitarianism,
in the last two decades of the twentieth century, it is curious to note that none of the
apparent key philosophical protagonists accept the description. Only one is ready to,
very diffidently, accept the label. The others are just antagonistic or uninterested. It
is still quite possible to argue that this is all irrelevant and that all do (underneath
the denials) subscribe to certain basic assumptions and modes of analysis, which can
be called communitarian. There is some truth to this and it is undoubtedly more
convenient for critical admirers or antagonists to have this ‘apparent consistency’ in
the communitarian position. It is more difficult, after all, to hit a moving or diffused
target, so why not force it to sit still. However, the above consideration should at least
make us wary.