An Eclectic Subject 7Energy, gravitation, or supply and demand curves, for example, cannot actually be
seen. Peirce comments that metaphysics, as the observation and study of foundational
claims, is also based on observation and ‘the only reason that this is not universally
recognized is that it rests upon kinds of phenomena with which every man’s experience
is so saturated that he usually pays no particular attention to them’. In this sense,
foundational beliefs are part of our everyday activity. Peirce continues: ‘The data
of metaphysics are not less open to observation, but immeasurably more so, than
the data, say, of the very highly developed science of astronomy’. What metaphysics
is therefore is the study of the ‘general features of reality and real objects’.^2 Thus it
should form an integral part of political theory.
In summary, this book works with the various senses of foundation. The term
‘foundationalism’ is used to anchor the various discussions as parts of a coherent
enterprise. Much (although not all) of the very early twentieth-century rendering of
political theory rests upon a more comprehensive and transcendental sense of founda-
tionalism. This latter sense of foundation also forms the wholly-negative backdrop
to much mid-twentieth century criticism of metaphysical foundationalism and even
the rejection of the practice of political theory. Various readings of the immanent
understanding of foundationalism underpin the recovery of much normative theory
in the final decades of the twentieth century. Both the comprehensive and immanent
forms of foundationalism also impact upon the disparate attempts to find alternative
justificatory foundational grounds for political theory within domains such as com-
munitarianism, nationalism, and the like. The theme of foundationalism in general
also forms the negative backdrop to the postmodern, anti- and post-foundationalist
and post-conventional critiques which developed in the last two decades of the twen-
tieth century. My employment of the third sense of logical foundationalism indicates
that, in the final analysis, I regard foundationalism as far broader than just early clas-
sical and normative political theory uses. Metaphysical foundationalism (understood
either comprehensively, immanently, or logically) figures, wittingly or unwittingly,
in virtually all political theories, including empiricist-orientated theories throughout
the century.
Theory and Politics
It is important to offer some brief clarification of the compound term ‘political theory’
and some of its cognates. I do not draw any rigid distinction between political theory
and political philosophy. They are considered, on most occasions, as synonymous. Is
this legitimate? The question here is broader than just theory and philosophy; other
domains are also implicated. Thus, is political theory the same as political thought
(treated more historically) or political ideology? In fact, political ideology and polit-
ical thought are often taken as more immediate cognates, although many political
theorists find this unacceptable. Would political theorists or philosophers be content,
for example, to be described as political ideologists? Is there some crucial difference
here? Political theory also has multifaceted relations with other secondary cognates,