New Conventions for Old 173philosophies and psychologies. Conservative ideologies still find sustenance in such
notions. There are, however, a complex range of issues present in this ‘untheoretical’
point.
First, the idea that nationalism is basically untheoretical can elicit two distinct
responses, one positive and the other negative: the ‘positive’ response by theorists
of nationalism sees its untheoretical character as immensely fruitful.^3 Something,
which is not easily theorizable or readily embodied in rational categories, is not
necessarily irrational. Clarity is therefore not enough and vagueness may be wel-
comed. All organizations, especially the state, require some kind of collective identity.
Thus, there is a kind of ‘ghostly presence’ behind much politics. Nations are seen
as powerfully present, in fact, conditionally necessary for states, yet often invisible.
Nationality, therefore, ‘makes possible the kind of community required by liberal
democratic theories’ (Canovan 1996: 68). Nations are indispensable, if hard to deal
with conceptually. In fact, nationalism may be regarded as a stage in the evolution of
the nation itself; the conceptual presence of nationalism may even mean the absence
of the nationper se.Prima facie, this view is surprising given that the untheoretical
character of nationalism is taken by others as a serious flaw.
The ‘negative’ response has two possible dimensions, one external and the other
internal to nationalism. Theexternaldimension sees nationalism as premised on
passions and irrationalism, in contrast to theories such as liberalism (and the social
sciences in general), which are premised on reason. Elie Kedourie and Karl Popper,
amongst others, subscribed to this view. In other words, nationalism is disapproved of
as an irrational tribalism. Theinternaldimension is promulgated by certain national-
ist writers themselves who also feel distinctly ill at ease with the ‘untheoretical’ claim.
This view denies the ‘untheoretical’ claim and asserts the need for rational nationalist
theory. Yael Tamir, for example, is quite insistent on this (Tamir in Beiner (ed.) 1999:
67). For her nationalism is theorizable. Thus, a theory of nationalism for Tamir struc-
tures itself ‘independently of all contingencies. Its basis must be a systematic view of
human nature and of the world order, as well as a coherent set of universally applicable
values’ (Tamir 1993: 82). This latter judgement is not helped by the fact that there
arenogreat nationalist theorists. There are honorary figures, such as J. G. Fichte,
Gottfried Herder, Ernest Renan, Julien Benda, amongst others, but one might hes-
itate to call them ‘self-conscious nationalist thinkers’. Despite this, Tamir’s general
position is shared by most contemporary political theorists interested in nationalism.
Before turning to a brief discussion of some of these ‘theoretical components’, one
more point needs to be examined. This focuses on the question: can nationalism
offer a general or universal theory? One of the central claims, internal to nation-
alist argument, is thatallmeaning and value are particular to the nation. This is
a crucial assumption for nationalism to work. Thus, logically, how can one offer a
universal theory from a baseline, which is by definition wholly particular? If all the-
ory (unless it is the one exception to the nationalist theory of meaning and thus
the one metatheoretical truth in the world) is particular, then no theory—even a
theory of nationalism—can be logically exempt. In this sense, could nationalists even
have a universal perspective? Such a theory could not, by definition, logically exist.