New Conventions for Old 175is just deeply implausible (see MacCormick in Twining (ed.) 1991: 13). Thus, Neil
MacCormick states, ‘The truth about human beings is that they can only become
individuals—acquire a sense of their own individuality—as a result of their social
experiences within human communities’ (MacCormick 1982: 247). Families, local
communities, nations, education, jobs, etc. have a formative effect on the indi-
vidual. However, he adds that ‘individuality goes beyond all that—but not in any
way that renders all that superfluous or meaningless; human individuality presup-
poses social existence’ (MacCormick 1982: 251). For MacCormick, though, despite
the social constitution argument, ‘I continue to affirm that the good society is one in
which individuals—each individual—are taken seriously’ (MacCormick 1982: 247).
Membership of groups, like nations, lets individuals transcend the constraints of time
and place; it also provides a conceptual framework, which permits them to ‘compre-
hend [their] own existence as belonging within a continuity in time and a community
in space’. Human beings take pride in tradition; it allows them to transcend their
‘earthly existence’.^4
David Miller also accepts the communitarian contextual individual claim in terms
of his own moderate nationalist conventionalism. For Miller, national communities
exist through belief, not race or language. Like Tamir, Miller also partly accepts the
artificial dimension of nationalist thought. Yet, there have to be some shared sub-
stantive beliefs or ‘attitudes, ritual observances and so forth’ for nationalism to exist
(Miller 1989: 244). It is not, however, a belief system which can be totally conjured
out of thin air. There is a prepolitical element to it which forms a precondition to
politics. It is an active identity, which embodies historical continuity (see Miller 1989:
238). Yet Miller also suggests that this national identity can be fostered through edu-
cation. This also leads to a critical unease with multiculturalism. It is an overarching
nationhood, which isthevalid source of human identity.
In addition, like MacCormick and Tamir, Miller thinks that the distinction between
the universalism and particularism of nationalism can be overdone. Local loyalties can
be linked with universalist claims. The nation is a valid form of ethical community.
For Miller, a ‘strengthening of commitment to a smaller group is likely to increase
our commitment to wider constituencies’, the point being, for Miller, that ‘if we
start out with selves already laden with particularist commitments...we may be
able to rationalize those commitments from a universalist perspective’ (Miller 1988:
661–2; Miller 1995). In general terms, for Miller, a state is more governable if it
is a national community. A state—especially a welfare state with programmes of
distributive justice—needs trust and voluntary cooperation to achieve its goals. It is
thus, apparently, ‘self-evident that ties of community are an important source of trust
between individuals who are not personally known to one another’ (Miller 1994: 142;
see also Miller 1995). Social justice and redistributive policies will be considerably
facilitated if people see themselves as conationals.
The second component of the liberal nationalist argument—respect for nations—
is more strongly emphasized by some theorists than others. For MacCormick, for
example, nations make up a part of our identity. Identity is deserving of respect.
The principle of respect obliges us to respect that ‘which in others constitutes